General BUELL. I am unwilling to be committed to a record made in that way; but if it is the decision of the Commission I have nothing more to say.

The PRESIDENT. That is the decision of the Commission.

General Granger continued:

some twelve or fifteen ambulances and two four-gun batteries, and taking a position about 2 miles from camp there awaited the approach of the column. The time in passing from the front to the was exactly two hours. It is upon this that I have in a measure made my estimate. At this ratio I have allowed twelve hours for the infantry and batteries to pass and six hours with a train. This answer is not given as a practical answer; it is given as a deduction from theory, from the fact that as the column is increased in numbers and its train in proportion it becomes more unwieldy and difficult to move. I do not know that any relative proportion where you increase the numbers and the consequent delay owing to this increase could be properly and accurately established.

Question. The calculation upon the date given shows that the army would make the distance in exactly the time stated. Do armies under ordinary circumstances march in this order when they are in the presence of an enemy, and how do you explain that under some circumstances they do make much greater distance in the aggregate?

In the movement of a heavy column in the vicinity of an enemy, to facilities it in procuring water, campaign grounds, fuel, forage, and also to avoid roads that are cut up by excessive travel, a commander would avail himself of all the roads lying parallel or nearly so or converging toward some common point of destination. If there was but one road, for convenience to his troops, facilities for camping,&c., he would divide it into two, three, or four bodies, moving them perhaps upon consecutive days. Thus divided upon the different roads or upon the same road, it is usual for these diminished columns to make the same distance or even greater distance in a much shorter period of time. This dispersion of troops, however, in the near vicinity of an enemy would be very injudicious. It would be necessary to keep them concentrated to prevent the enemy from falling upon them and defeat them in detail.

Question. Supposing the position of the enemy to be known, how close could the head of the column or army, moving on one road as we have supposed, properly approach that position before closing up its rear and putting itself somewhat in order of battle?

It will be necessary for me to suppose a case in order to give an answer to the question. If the country affords no cover, such as mountains, forest, streams, to conceal the approach of the army, and, again, should the enemy be on the alert, which the commander is supposed to know, keeping their front well reconnoitered and picketed, it would be extremely hazardous to move this column in the order described to within a less distance than 8 or 10 miles. At a point in this proximity it would be necessary at once to close up this column, and as fast as closed to form in order of battle, or at least to take position for a strong resistance until such time as the commander can close up his troops and make the necessary dispositions for battle. The nature of the country, the strength of the adversary, and his vigilance must always guide a commander in approaching an enemy in position. If he is satisfied that they have taken up their lines of defense or line of battle and intend to give battle at that point, he may bring the head of his columns much nearer before deploying them. Should the country afford facilities to enable him to amuse or divert them by a powerful advance guard, he might bring them up to about two or three miles, and there close up and make his final arrangements for battle. Another fact that has much to do with this is points where water can be procured for the purpose of filling the mean's canteens before going into action. In some instances it may be necessary to go near the enemy before deploying. The nature of the streams or springs may be such that but few men cam procure water at the same time. A thousand considerations must influence the commander in movements and dispositions of this kind.

Question. Would the absence of water in sufficient quantity to suffice for an army any considerable time, say two or three days, sometimes prevent a commander from taking upon a position which might have great strategic advantages and occupying that position for considerable time, during which the enemy may at his option give or avoid battle at that point?

If water could only be found sufficient for the use of the army at a distance of,