of supplies, which was occasioned by the breaks in the railroads and some work that some portions of the army were required to do in repairing railroads; but had the army been concentrated at Stevenson I am very far from supposing that a much larger force would not have been thrown into Chattanooga by the rebels at an earlier day.

Question. You stated in your examination-in-chief that you considered it would have been unsafe to go to Chattanooga if there had been nobody there to resist. Please give your reasons, general.

I would have considered it unsafe to march with the command which we had at Battle Creek to Chattanooga if there had been no enemy there to oppose us, because we were cut off from our source of supplies and could not have expected to find supplies at Chattanooga. We should have been compelled to go back for supplies, and would have incurred some risk in passing through that country from even small parties of guerrillas. We might have lost some transportation and could have accomplished nothing.

Question. You say the country across the mountains from Chattanooga was very destitute of provisions. Was the Sequatchie Valley, the route Bragg's army took, also destitute; and, if not, did it not make it almost sure that Bragg would come out at Pikeville or Sparta?

The Sequatchie Valley, I understand, was not destitute of provisions or supplies. I saw only a portion of it. I was not far up the Sequatchie Valley; as far as I did go it is a narrow valley and not very much cultivated nor very abundant in its supplies. I cannot say that I considered it certain at all that General Bragg would come out at Pikeville or Sparta. To tell the truth I was not sure that he would not come down the Sequatchie Valley in pursuit of McCook and myself.

Question. At McMinnville had not the Army of the Ohio its subsistence assured by railroad communication; and could it, with McMinnville as a base, supply itself at or near Sparta had it been concentrated there, the distance being only about 25 miles?

The Army of the Ohio concentrated at McMinnville had its supplies quite secure, but with its supplies at McMinnville and the Army of the Ohio at Sparta I should have considered its depot of supplies as very insecure.

Question. Will you give your reasons, general?

If General Bragg, on the road from Chattanooga to Sparta or McMinnville, were at liberty to take what road he pleased, and with such a force of cavalry as he had with him, it might have been possible for General Bragg to reach McMinnville before the army at Sparta could come back to defend its supplies.

Question. Do you not know that General Bragg's army arrived at Sparta very much demoralized from exhaustion from that march up the Sequatchie Valley?

I do not, sir; I understood that General Bragg's army suffered a great deal throughout that march; I do not remember to have heard that they were very much demoralized at that place.

Question. If his army suffered in that march up the Sequatchie Valley what would have been its condition if it had attempted to cross the mountains by any of those roads which you characterized as being destitute of provisions and I believe also of water?

If the Sequatchie Valley is a very rich valley he could not have suffered much coming up. If he had crossed the mountains he would have suffered the same hardships, I suppose, and encountered the same difficulties that we encountered.

Question. How long a time after the 20th of August, the date you gave Bragg to have crossed the Tennessee River at Chattanooga, would it have required to concentrate the Army of the Ohio at or near McMinnville?

I do not know precisely where the various portions of the army were at that time, but in seven or eight days, I suppose, if they had all supplies and had been ready to