eral Negley's command, whether it was a brigade or a division. I supposed that General Bragg could have marched his army over that road, as a brigade had passed over it, because I crossed the mountains in the latter part of August with two divisions, when there was no water on the mountains, literally none for animals. I also had an additional reason for inferring that was a practicable road from the fact that I knew General Buell had ordered General McCook up the Sequatchie Valley to that road, and my impression was that his object in sending General McCook there was that he might watch that road and hinder Bragg if possible from taking it.

Question. Do you recollect, general, what estimate General McCook placed upon the rebel force after the Army of the Ohio left Nashville and whether he did not fix the number at 25,000 or 30,000?

I do not remember, sir, hearing General McCook make any estimate.

Question. Did you not hear General McCook say in Bowling Green that there were but 25,000 or 30,000 ragged rascals there and that we ought to go and whip them?

I cannot remember hearing General McCook make such an assertion.

Question. Was not the Army of the Ohio exceedingly demoralized after it left Nashville, and was not that in a great measure in consequence of a general feeling of disappointment at not having been permitted to meet the enemy?

I think the morale of the army was very much improved after reaching Nashville-in truth, after reaching Murfreesborough. I think the army generally expected that they were going to battle on their march into Kentucky; therefore, of course, they were not demoralized, because they were going to fight.

Question. Were not the straggling and desertion almost without a parallel in the Army of the Ohio in that march from Nashville to Louisville?

There was considerable straggling and desertion; I suppose desertion is the proper term, though the men who left merely absented themselves without leave and as a general thing came back. There were a number of Kentucky regiments who passed near to their homes on that march, and I ascribe most of these desertions to that cause. I think the desertions were more than paralleled at Louisville after the junction of the two armies.

Question. Did not the Army of the Ohio lose from 8,000 to 10,000 men from desertion alone in that march and at Louisville?

I cannot say what the loss of the Army of the Ohio was from that cause.

Question. Is not that loss taken into account in the statement General Rosecrans made to you?

General Rosecrans gave me no particulars at all. I presume that every loss was included, from every cause, in his statement.

Question. What measures were ordered by the commander of the Army of the Ohio to put a stop to the men straggling or deserting from their regiments prior to the battle of Perryville and what did you do in your division to arrest desertion?

We had frequent orders. I cannot remember precisely what the orders were, but straggling or desertions of that kind seemed to provoke the general commanding more than anything else. Orders were again and again issued and rear guards were established and commanders were held responsible for their men. There was no particular measure that I adopted, that I remember now, except that I kept a rear guard to bring up stragglers and notified my subordinate officers that I would hold them accountable for their men-that they must keep them in their ranks. I am not positive, but I think we had to each regiment a rear guard to keep the men in their ranks. Many of the commanders adopted the rule to make the colonel commanding ride in the rear of his regiment to see that the men did not straggle. I am not sure that the general commanding did not issue an order to that effect, though I will not be positive about it.