Question. It embraced, I suppose, the capture of Chattanooga?

Yes, sir; of course.

Question. After the movement began, if General Buell had moved directly on Chattanooga what was there to prevent its capture?

I have this difficulty in answering the question: My own opinion is that General Buell advanced upon Chattanooga as rapidly as he could, and that the occupation of Chattanooga by the rebel army was the obstacle in addition to General Buell's want of supplies. The difficulty in getting supplies for the army in consequence of breaks made in the roads by the rebels delayed a portion of his command I know at several points on the march toward Chattanooga. If General Buell could have marched his entire army without any delay to Chattanooga, and if by a rapid march he could have reached there before any greater force of the enemy had been concentrated there, I should think he would have had no difficulty in taking Chattanooga, my impression being that at that time there was a not a sufficient force of rebels there to resist General Buell's army.

QQuestion. Why was Chattanooga considered a point of so much importance?

Chiefly, I suppose, because of the different railroads that center there and of the river that passes by it.

Question. With General Buell at Chattanooga and General Morgan at Cumberland Gap was not East Tennessee, including the railroad through it to Virginia, in General Buell's power?

I think so, sir.

Question. With Chattanooga in General Buell's possession, with his supplies collected from East Tennessee and all the region commanded by Chattanooga, could not the Army of the Ohio have been subsisted long enough at that point to have covered expeditions and detachments sent to destroy that railroad as far east as Jonesborough?

I know but little of the resources of the country commanded by Chattanooga, except in a limited portion along the Sequatchie Valley. My impression is that it is a barren country, and I suppose from the fact of the rebels having occupied Chattanooga for a considerable time that the country around was somewhat exhausted of its supplies. I suppose also that the force which General Buell would have driven from Chattanooga would have had it in their power to destroy any railroads that he could have used. But I do not believe that he could have subsisted his army upon the country around Chattanooga. General Buell must have reached Chattanooga with but a very limited quantity of supplies, and I think he must have relied for supplies upon the usual road, that is the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. A few days perhaps an army could have lived upon the country, but my impression is not longer than that. I do not think General Buell could have remained at Chattanooga until an expedition could have been sent to Jonesborough. There would have had to be concert and understanding between the forces of General Buell and those at Cumberland Gap. He would have had to remain until the news of his occupation of that place was known at Cumberland Gap and to be apprised that an expedition had started to Knoxville, all of which would have occupied time, and I do not think it would have been practicable for him to have subsisted his army at Chattanooga until that could have been accomplished. General Bragg, we understood, derived his supplies while at Chattanooga from a depot at Atlanta, so far as he did not or could not supply himself from the country around Chattanooga.

Question. Was not the country or any portion of it along your line of march from Corinth to Chattanooga productive and capable of yielding supplies if energy had been used for that purpose?

From the time we got down into the valley perhaps until we reached Tuscumbia the country was a fertile one; the corn fields had been planted and the crops promised to be fine, but the corn was green and not fit for use for our animals. I do not think we passed through and country that would have subsisted such an army if the army had to rely upon the country for its supplies for any length of time. The cotton plantations do not raise much grain ordinarily, and our impression was that they