The WITNESS. I will state that in running the parallel between the two battles yesterday I was answering the questions which were propounded to me by the Commission. As to the conduct of General Buell at the battle of Perryville I can say nothing. During the day on which that battle was fought I do not think I saw General Buell. I remained with my command all day and I do not think he was there. At Stone River I saw General Rosecrans very frequently during the battle. I do not think that I contrasted the conduct of the troops in the two battles. As to my opinion about the two commanders it is a very decided one.

General TYLER. It is not a matter of opinion, general; it is as to what you saw and heard of the conduct of the two commanders on the battle-field.

As I said, I did not see General Buell at Perryville, nor do I now remember to have heard of him on the battle-field at any place except at headquarters. Since the battle undoubtedly I have heard General Buell's conduct criticised. I have heard it spoken of as a most extraordinary thing that he permitted a portion of his army to be engaged and repulsed by the enemy when he had a large force there that was not engaged at all. I have heard many other officers say that General Buell was not to blame at all for the matter. I stated that I saw General Rosecrans frequently on the battle-field at Stone River. I saw him galloping about the field in many directions. I have heard him censured by a great many officers for his impetuosity, for his great excitement during the battle. I have heard him censured by commanders because they said they could not turn their backs on their commands without his ordering portions of them away.

General DANA. Would there be a manifest propriety or impropriety in the commanding general of an army of 40,000 men habitually exposing himself to a dangerous fire?

I do not think a commander who habitually exposes himself to a dangerous fire is qualified to command any large army.

By General DANA:

Question. In proportion as the size of this army and the importance of this command increases, say up to 65,000 or 70,000 men, would the disqualification be more or less apparent if he habitually exposed himself to danger?

In my judgment more dangerous. It would be a decided disqualification.

Question. Would there be propriety in the commanding general of an army, with less than half of his troops engaged, and with his reserves entirely fresh and out of action, to head an assault or to appear in the midst of a murderous fire?

There would be great impropriety in such conduct in my judgment.

Question. As a general rule is the sudden death or the sudden disabling of the commanding general of a large army among the worst disasters that can befall it?

As a general rule, yes.

Question. Do you or do you not consider it of doubtful propriety for the commanding general of a large army to lead a charge under any circumstances, except when his last reserves are being brought into action, his situation becoming desperate, and an absolute necessity exists for the moral courage of his troops to be restored by the impetuosity of daring and the encouragement which is inspired by the immediate presence of the commanding general?

I think that a commanding general of a large army ought never to expose himself by leading a charge so long as there is any place left for his judgment and coolness and discretion, and that he ought to remain out of the confusion of battle, where he could control and direct the movements of his entire army, and that only in the last resort, when everything depended upon the valor of his troops, only then could he be justified or excused by putting himself at the head of his men and leading a charge.

Question. Do you know of any other instance in the life of Napoleon than the desperate charges at Arcola and Lodi and the last desperate