them, for no matter how poorly off they were, it was their boasted saying the the rebel troops should be the last to suffer for anything to eat wherever they and the people were concerned, when by connivance and preconcerted action supplies could be gathered for the rebels by the people themselves. Our army would have been compelled to visit every individual and to have taken supplies by force. My experience in foraging, even in a good country, induces me to believe that where an army subsist on a country's resources, without the aid of depots, it requires one day to forage for another.

Question. Did the organized bands of guerrillas give the enemy any advantage in this respect?

It did; because the guerrillas, at home in the neighborhood they infested, could be easily supplies by their families, on account of their knowledge of the country, whereas it would be impossible to have subsisted our troops; the rebel plan being generally to scatter and hide during the day and meet at night for the purpose of their raids, by this course making them entirely independent of a commissariat requisite to handle our troops in the field, especially while we were in a hostile country.

Question. Can you form any estimate of the cavalry force that would be required to counteract this advantage which the rebels had, say in the district of country occupied by the Army of the Ohio last summer?

On account of the facilities enjoyed by the rebels in Tennessee and of their sympathizers in Kentucky, their knowledge of the country, and the rapidity of the movements of the rebel cavalry, it has always appeared to me to be necessary to have a cordon of cavalry or mounted men from Louisville to Huntsville strong enough at any available point on the railroad to meet any attack which the rebels in any force might hurl against them. This would have involved a large number of troops to effect a purpose, for which the small body of cavalry required for this purpose. From the results of the rebel raids it was always my impression that no matter how much cavalry we had we never could have too much, for in a line of communication extending from Louisville to Nashville, and occupying two lines of railroad south from Nashville, as we did, embracing over 500 miles of communication, it appears to me almost impossible for such a line to be guarded thoroughly and safely, so as to make a constant communication certain, with less than 100,000 [?] troops of cavalry, doing nothing else but guarding the lines, because every vulnerable point in that line, if guarded at all, should be guarded so as to make certain defense against any attack whatsoever by the enemy; that is, such a certain defense as I consider was required by such a line of communication, liable to be broken at any hour.

Question. Taking the district of country which the Army of the Ohio occupied last summer, what amount of cavalry force do you think would be required, in an attempt to subsist on the country, to neutralize the inconvenience resulting from the unfriendly disposition of the people and the large guerrilla force scattered through the country, so as to enable the Army of the Ohio to derive all the benefit possible from the resources of the country?

I frequently heard cavalry officers occupied in guarding wagon trains say that 5,000 and 6,000 cavalry between Nashville was hardly sufficient to drive the guerrillas out. The line between Nashville and Louisville, it appears to me, would have taken a great many more, on account of the distance.

Question. Has your experience in commercial business given you an opportunity of knowing anything of the agricultural resources of Middle Tennessee?

It has. I am personally cognizant that Nashville has always been one of the largest markets for Cincinnati for the disposition of meat products, and the shipment of subsistence supplies. In my journeys through Middle Tennessee, in conversation with the planters, I have frequently asked the reason for purchasing their food in the North, when such a rich country as Middle Tennessee could produce it equally as well as our own lands. The reasons were these, that they scarcely would raise grain enough for their won negroes and animals, because they found it much more profitable to plant cotton, and for this reason they devoted their lands to the most profitable culture and obtained heir food from the North.