[CHAP. XXVIII.

Question. Did you concur with General Morgan in the interpretation of that dispatch that it required him not only to cease further operations in advance but to fall back?

I did interpret it as General Morgan did, but deemed that General Morgan's not strictly obeying the orders was almost imperative on him at the time owing to the demoralization that had come over his troops on receiving this order. I deemed, further, that had General Morgan disobeyed the order he would not have been blamed by General Buell, because our information of the enemy's weakness in the Gap was so certain (I may say) that we felt equally certain of taking possession of it as soon as we had cut off that communication, which we did the very day we appeared on the south side of the Gap. This discussion was a very long one, and General Buell's interests in the matter as a soldier were as much looked to as General Morgan's. I felt convinced at the time, and I believe so expressed it to General Morgan, that General Buell would have approved of the course of conduct under the circumstances, as General Buell could not have known when he sent his dispatch that General Morgan had advanced so far on so long and so difficult a march. One part of the march, I being in advance with my brigade, we had to construct 2 miles of road, besides cutting out about 6 miles of blockade, extending with interruptions about 6 miles. If my memory serves me, I believe no communication had taken place between General Buell and General Morgan for several days previous to the receipt of the dispatch now in question.

Question. Were those instructions executed according to the interpretation you placed upon them?

They were to a degree.

Question. Was the enemy supposed to be in possession of Cumberland Gap at that time?

Question. Did General Morgan subsequently depart from those instructions, according to your interpretation of them, by going to Cumberland Gap?

Strictly speaking he did, and I was the principal cause of it. Immediately after the receipt of the dispatch General Morgan ordered a counter-march of all the troops then assembled at Rogers' Gap, and directed me to cover the movement with my brigade, the enemy then being in the valley skirmishing with my advance post. The movement began and was completed, so far as the other brigades were concerned, and I had ordered one regiment of my brigade to follow. This regiment had proceeded about half a mile on its way back when a well-known Union man, a Tennessean, arrived at the mill at Rogers' Gap, where I was staying, with information that the enemy was leaving the Gap. I made inquiries of this man, and his answers were of such a nature as to convince me that he was telling the truth. I immediately stopped the movement of my brigade and of two batteries which were to move through Rogers' Gap, and forwarded a dispatch of my action to General Morgan, who had been then gone about twenty-four or thirty hours, I believe. He answered, approving of what I had done, and informed me that he would return and concentrate there once more all our troops.

Question. If those instructions were of so vague and indefinite a character that General Morgan could depart from them when there was no enemy to oppose him, do you not think that he could with greater propriety have departed from them when there was some danger but great advantage to be gained by such departure?

I do not think the instructions were vague. The discussion which took place as to obeying was not so much a question of interpreting the order, but respected more the necessities of the case as it then stood, keeping in view that General Buell probably could not have been at that time well informed as to the position of General Morgan's troops. The disobedience of the order, if disobedience there be in the act, after we had heard that the Gap was evacuated, was, in my opinion, imperative on General Morgan, because the enemy would certainly hear of our retrograde movement that evening and might have returned to the Gap and we should have had all our trouble over again, whilst by marching directly upon him from Rogers' Gap- a much shorter route than the other one would have been and a much easier one-we made certain of taking and holding the position. There were also some political con-