[CHAP. XXVIII.

intend by this to refer only to the zone of General Morgan's operations, which never at any one time extended in a westerly direction farther than Jacksborough.

Question. Then, if you please, I will repeat the question put in the first instance. Within how short a distance of the Gap could you at any time within the first month after your arrival there have found the enemy in sufficient force to be worth the trouble of chastising?

I think that any time within one month after our occupation of the Gap, after the 18th of June, we should have found something like a force of 6,000 or 7,000 of the enemy between Clinch River and Knoxville; and if my memory serves me right, and I think it does, I can remember that all the information brought us by our own spies, of loyal Tennesseans, refugees from the districts between Clinch River and Knoxville, tended to show that General Morgan might have operated toward Knoxville by two or three roads without much danger to his forces.

Question. Have you meant to be understood in your evidence that from the 18th of June until the 15th of July there were not more than 6,000 or 7,000 troops in all Eastern Tennessee?

I did not mean to convey that that was the number the enemy had in Eastern Tennessee, except as far as General Morgan's zone of operations was concerned. I consider that zone of operations to have extended south as far as Knoxville, west toward Jamestown, not farther than Jacksborough, and east to some point near Bean's Station, Granger County.

Question. Have you any knowledge of the enemy's force in East Tennessee beyond the limits of this zone you have described?

I have a pretty good knowledge of the forces east of the zone under Humphrey Marshall, and I do not believe that he ever had at any one time after our occupation of Cumberland Gap a force exceeding 1,800 or 2,000, and this force in very poor state of organization. I have no positive knowledge of the forces south and west of the zone above described further than what was derived from loyal East Tennesseeans, who seemed to think that the enemy had not a very large force beyond the zone, and that force fully occupied in defending or preparing for the defense of Chattanooga.

Question. Did you and General Morgan exchange views on this subject freely and were your opinions about the same?

We exchanged opinions on this subject often and very freely, and we coincided in the opinion that shortly after our occupation of the Gap he could have operated toward and against Knoxville.

Question. You mean by that of course that he could have defeated the enemy and occupied Knoxville?

I do; and I here repeat what I have already placed in my deposition, that shortly after the occupation of the Gap I asked General Morgan to allow me to proceed with my brigade of three regiments and one battery toward a point near Morristown, to there tap the railroad; and a letter which I found in the post-office in one of my foraging expeditions to Tazewell convinced me that said expedition would have been successful, the letter being written by an officer then in charge of that post and addressed to some rebel general, asking that he might be re-enforced, inasmuch as he had not men enough to carry on the daily fatigue duty and guards.

Question. What was the date of that proposition of yours to General Morgan?

It must have been three or four days after our taking the Gap.

Question. Might you have done the same thing in a month after taking the Gap?

I think I could have done it with two brigades, but not with one, by rapid marching at night on first starting from the Gap, so as to prevent the enemy concentrating on their right by drawing troops which were beginning to assemble in position on Clinch River, in Anderson County.

Question. You have testified to the ability and willingness of General Morgan to operate successfully against the rebel force in East Tennessee? Have you equal confidence in his reports to the headquarters of the army on that subject?