when an attack was expected, indicates great carelessness or wanton neglect on the part of the officers in command. I would recommend that a list of all the men forming the guards or pickets be furnished and a court of inquiry instituted to report on the conduct of each and every man on this duty.

Respectfully submitted.

W. JENKINS,

Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. Army.

Captain H. C. McDOWELL, Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure A.]

Statement of Colonel Boone, Twenty-eighth Kentucky Volunteers.

I took command at Gallatin, Tenn., about 1st May, 1862, with five companies of Twenty-eighth Kentucky Volunteers, averaging about 75 men each. After being detached for some time at Lebanon and other points, guarding bridges, returned to Gallatin.

I have been apprehensive for about three weeks that an attack would be made on my position. This I made known to General Nelson, and applied for re-enforcements, and especially for some cavalry, for the purpose of scouting. Expected the enemy was at Sparta or above Carthage in that direction. Carthage is 32 miles above Gallatin, on the Cumberland River, and same side. Communicated by information to Colonel Miller at Nashville by telegraph, and also by adjutant, asking for re-enforcements. Morgan was supposed to have about 1,200 men and Starnes from 800 to 1,500, and were expected to combine forces.

My troops were disposed as follows: Captain O'Neill was sent with his company to the south tunnel, 7 miles north of Gallatin, on the railroad, with orders to have at least 20 men there, and the balance distributed between five bridges and the tank on the line of the road between the tunnel and the Kentucky line, the most distant being 7 miles north of the tunnel and 14 miles from Gallatin. The remaining four companies were distributed as follows: One sergeant and 10 men at tunnel 4 miles north of Gallatin; 1 sergeant and 10 men at bridge 2 miles south of Gallatin; 1 sergeant and 10 men at bridge at Pilot Knob, 7 miles south, and a regular daily detail of 1 sergeant and 10 men to guard the depot and tank at Gallatin.

The evening before the attack Colonel Bruce, at Bowling Green, sent to me to re-enforce a party of his command who were after a drove of beef cattle, moving in the direction of Carthage, for the Confederate forces. After some hesitation and on receiving a second dispatch from Colonel Bruce I finally concluded to scout in that direction, and sent out two companies, under Captains Noble and White, of about 50 men each, to scout toward La Fayette and Carthage (that being the direction from which I feared an attack), ordering them to press horses and mount the men as soon as they were about 5 miles from town, and to get all their men mounted. This was the only disposition possible to form a junction with the detachment of Colonel Bruce. But fearing they might the intercepted by Morgan's forces ordered them to retreat to our camp in case they discovered anything of them. I did not make known this movement or send the force out until late at night, when the people had retired, so as not to have my weakened position known. They were instructed to keep an advanced guard not less than 2 miles in advance (about 10 men), and a similar guard on each flank as scouts, so as to embrace a considerable tract for observation. Being more ap-