forces. He went away and returned, saying that Colonel Woodward, who commanded the force attacking us, requested a personal interview, to which I saw no objections, and we met midway. I made the same inquiry of him and he assented. I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews to examine and count their force, which he did, and on his return stated that they were over 800 strong one company armed with volcanic rifles (16-shooters); one with Sharps carbines; the remainder of the cavalry with double-barreled shot-guns, and part of the infantry with muskets.

They had a battery of three guns, with caissons, in the corn field, but he did not go to them. They were afterward found to be 6 and 12 pounder field pieces. This report was made to the officers, and their vote was reported to me as about three-fourths for surrender and the remainder against it. I told them to rejoin their companies; that notwithstanding the disparity of force I would fight them.

Before or about the time I reached the flag I was called by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, who informed me that owing to the overpowering force opposed, their display of artillery, to which we had nothing to reply, and only brick walls to oppose, the men were found, in some companies at least, to be discouraged, and that the officers unanimously recommended a surrender.

Of the 225 men reported for duty 22 were on river guard, 7 on telegraph, guard, and 6 out on telegraph line, repairing it-in all 35; leaving of those who ought to have been in camp 190; but of those only 152 were reported to me as in camp, including the camp guard of 42 men. Where the other 38 were I do not know.

I was then to determine whether I would, with this force of 152 men, or may be 175, by arming prisoners and bringing in men who might not be in line, fight over 800 men, armed as well as we were for the sort of a fight that was impending, most of their men being soldiers of the regular army, who had been sent home to recruit under Johnson, Woodward, and Garth, the 800 being increased by several hundred citizens who had appeared already in arms, and who were being constantly increased by men coming inform every direction. Had it been simply a fight of small-arms there would have been a general willingness to attempt to hold the college against any odds; but their artillery gave them complete control of this, and then we had nothing left. We had, as you are aware, no artillery. A little gun (found at the rolling-mill), that would not chamber a grape-shot, had been sent from Fort Donelson, and mounted at a gun carriage for a 24-pounder, was of no earthly value, and if it had been we had no ammunition for it. All the mein the city, nearly one-third of my aggregate, were already in the hands of the enemy. We had no hope of re-enforcements and no possibility, with the Cumberland and Red Rivers on three sides of us and an enemy indefinite in numbers in front, to retreat. To me then was submitted the question whether, against the judgments of all my commissioned officers, and my own most deliberately formed judgment (for I was dealing with a state of facts that for weeks I had contemplated and attempted to provide against), I should sacrifice the lives of my soldiers to the hope of retrieving a reputation for myself and survivors. However strongly personal considerations required my making a desperate resistance my conscience required me to surrender, and now, reviewing all the facts, I think I did my duty.

Anxious to save every possible chance, I stipulated that the surrender should not be made until sundown, at which time I yielded my camp, the entire mass of public property outside having been inevitably in the hands of the enemy from the beginning. I advised against