ordered to throw his cavalry well out on the Battle Creek and Stevenson roads. Scarcely had the Thirty-second crossed when the cavalry reported enemy's infantry and cavalry approaching in force, the truth of which was made apparent from the clouds of dust in the rads. I immediately ordered the Thirty-second to be formed in line of battle near the crest of the hill in the town, and in a few moments the enemy's cavalry (Fourth Ohio and one other, name not known) dashed up in full speed, and were permitted to come within less than 50 yards of the infantry before a gun was fired, when a galling fire was poured into them and they retreated in great confusion. In a short time clouds of dust warned me of the enemy's approach on our left, and to meet it I had the front of the left wing changed forward in time to receive another dash of cavalry, which was again thrown in confusion by another volley more effective than the first, and he again retreated but reformed, and by the dust I soon saw he was approaching the center. A company of the Thirty-second Alabama, armed with the Enfield rifle, commanded by Lieutenant [A.] Sellers, was placed in the center in ambush, and as the enemy came up the hill in very close range this company arose and delivered its deadly fire simultaneously with the wings (separated for cover), and this time they broke and fled in perfect confusion. While this portion of the fight was going on my batteries, consisting of Captain [S. L.] Freeman's {Tennessee] and Captain [G. A.] Dure's [Georgia] artillery and one 24-pounder rifle gun, opened out (by previous agreement on the enemy's works at the mounth of Battle Creek, about 5 miles distant up the river, and continued incessantly during the entire day. The heavy columns of dust bearing toward Stevenson from the enemy's camps around there showed a general commotion. At night I ordered the battery commanders to keep the fire up, believing the enemy, if properly managed, would evacuate before day.

At about 2 o'clock in the morning the work was abandoned in great confusion, the enemy burning most of his commissary stores, but leaving in our possession some $30,000 worth of valuable property, embracing some commissary stores, ordnance stores, quartermaster's stores, clothing, all his tents, 32 horses and 4 mules, a few wagons and ambulances, and some few medicines, and a splendid case of surgical instruments, besides some sutler's stores, a number of officers' trunks, many of the post commander's papers, and some very valuable maps.

It is proper to observe that after the fight commenced at Bridgeport the Third Georgia Cavalry and Twenty-fifth Tennessee Infantry were ordered across, but did not reach the place in time to participate; indeed it was only after the fight had opened that I received notice that the Third Georgia was placed at my disposal temporarily.

I was informed by the major-general commanding several days ago that some cavalry under Colonel Lay would move down the Sequatchie Valley, and I had hoped to have its assistance. At 10 p.m. on the 27th I received a note from Colonel Lay, dated Jasper, 5.30 p.m., informing me that he was there with 550 cavalry, and desired me to inform him of my movements, stating that he heard the cannonading, &c. This I did, with an expression of belief that the enemy would be shelled out before morning, and saying to him in substance that if he would take his position about the mounth of Sweeden's Cove about daylight he would probably get them. It is unfortunate that these suggestions were not acted on, for if they had been the enemy, being panic-stricken by throwing cavalry in his front, the hills on either side, and my forces in rear, would have been easy prey.

I am indebted to Captain T. M. Scott, assistant adjutant-general; Captain