About 2 p.m. the enemy followed us with infantry and cavalry. After

warmly engaging them for some time we endeavored to draw them down

position where the bulk of our force was stationed and where we

could develop their strength, and, if possible, separate their infantry

from their cavalry. In this we failed. The enemy soon retired, leaving

1 man dead on the field and carrying off 1 major and 10 privates

wounded, some of them seriously. We followed them a short distance

with about 200 men, but as night was coming on and we were near their

strong force we soon rejoined our reserves. General Forrest came up

in the rear while the fight was going on, but finding he could not engage

the enemy to advantage he retired toward Glasgow.

The next day we proceeded to Merry Oaks, a place midway between

Bowling Green and Glasgow, to cover our army and watch the move-

ments of the enemy. We remained at this point, watching the several

approaches to Bowling Green, until the 16th, when we moved down to

Oakland Station, 7 miles east of Bowling Green, leaving a small force

at Merry Oaks to watch the movements of the enemy on the two lower

roads.

That night the enemy moved Rousseau's division and a large cavalry

force over the river on the Glasgow or Cave City pike, while at the same

time more extensive arrangements were being made for a movement

across the river in a northerly direction, which led me to believe that

the bulk of General Buell's army was to move in that direction. This

was also the opinion of all my agents who had been sent into the town.

In this we were deceived. The wagon train of General Buell's army,

consisting of over 2,000 wagons, crossed in the northerly direction with

a comparatively small guard, while the rest of the army moved toward

Cave City. Colonel [John F.] Lay had been sent to Dripping Springs,

with orders to report to me, and Colonel Bennett s command was de-

tached. The enemy pressed upon my pickets during the night, which,

together with other movements on their part, convinced me that an early

advance was intended. About daylight the enemy's cavalry in large force

moved up rapidly in good order toward Cave City, followed by infantry.

Finding that they had passed our position we moved rapidly by a cir-

cuitous route to gain their front, having previously directed Colonel

Lay to remain at his post until our arrival, in order that our combined

forces might more effectually retard the enemy. Orders were also sent

to the battalion at Merry Oaks to join me at the same place. On arriv-

ing there, however, I found Colonel Lay had been gone some time, and

also heard that the detachment at Merry Oaks had been driven in by a

large force of cavalry. After resisting the enemy's advance until late

in the day we finally moved toward Glasgow to collect all detachments

on the lower roads and protect some trains at that point. These trains

we escorted to Munfordville, arriving at that point about 8 o'clock the

next morning.

Our total loss in killed and wounded was 2 officers and 3 privates.

At night we moved down to Horse Cave, near Cave City, to picket

the front and watch the enemy, who was concentrating his troops at

that place. We were here joined by the First and Third Alabama Regi-

ments, Colonel Lay having been detached. We continued picketing

the front, frequently skirmishing heavily with the enemy, with some

loss on both sides.

On the morning of the 20th the enemy advanced and deployed their

lines in front of their advanced pickets. Our army being now moving

from Munfordville, our front was kept unchanged and every effort made

to prevent the enemy from learning our movements Toward evening