The position of the enemy at Munfordville is too strong to be taken by infantry or such light artillery as I had; they can, however, be easily shelled out with heavier guns, either from this side of the river or the other. When hostilities ceased on yesterday my guns were within 200 yards of the works and my infantry had driven all the enemy inside of them and [they were] compelled to keep themselves closely concealed behind them. There are points more distant from which the works could be easily shelled with

12-pounder guns, if none heavier could be got. The best approach to the place from Glasgow on this side the river is by the Burkesville road. Points from which the works can be shelled can be reached whit but little danger of injury from their heavy guns.

The information upon which I made the attack deceived me completely as to the number of the enemy, the strength of their works, and the possibility of their being re-enforced. I was told that they had from 1,200 to 1,800 men, that no re-enforcements could possibly reach them, and was led to believe that their works were nothing more than rifle pits, and they perhaps unfinished, which could be easily taken by a bold dash with an infantry force, when in truth they had not less than 2,500 men; their works were extensive and complete and mounted with heavier guns than I had, and I am credibly informed that on Saturday they received a re-enforcement of 200 men, and during that night or early on yesterday morning a regiment of 500 old troops, under Colonel Dunham, arrived. In the last interview had with them at the termination of the truce Colonel Dunham had assumed the command. He had been in the fort for some time, but had declined to supersede Colonel Wilson [Wilder] until the termination of the truce. It is due to Colonel Scott, Louisiana cavalry, from whom I received my information, to say that he was himself misled as to the strength and disposition of the enemy by the fact that on Saturday night, when he demanded the surrender of the fort, the commander answered that he could not surrender to a cavalry brigade, leaving the inference to be drawn that if he had been supported by an infantry force they would have surrendered to it. I do not understand how he was deceived as to the possibility of re-enforcements coming to them.

I fear that I may have incurred censure at headquarters by my action in this matter, but with the information in my possession I felt that it was my duty to make the attempt and I could only believe that the result would be successful. This impression was strengthened at the beginning of the attack by the following incidents: A large force of the enemy, estimated at from two to three regiments, which we found drawn up in line of battle, retreated with but little resistance before the advance of my battalion of sharpshooters, who drove them into their rifle pits, and at the same time the enemy set fire to what I supposed to be the railroad bridge, but what, as I afterwards found, was a church near their principal work. In addition to this their artillery refused to reply to ours except by an occasional shot until ours had been moved up within a few hundred yards of them. These facts, connected with the information which I had previously received, forced me to the belief that the enemy were preparing to retreat or that they could be easily forced to surrender.

My heaviest loss was on the left, which was under the immediate command of Colonel Smith, of the Tenth Mississippi Regiment. I had originally instructed him to advance upon the left and observe the enemy, and if he thought he could do so successfully, to charge the entrenchments; but afterwards, when I had gained a position upon the enemy's left and in rear of the entrenchments upon which Colonel Smith