taken by surprise, and possession was immediately and quietly taken of the telegraph and post-offices and of the railroad depot. It being expected that one our more trains of the enemy's troops would pass up the road from Bowling Green toward Louisville the track was torn up and other preparations were made to capture it, but the train did not make its appearance.

The brigade was encamped near the town and strong pickets were thrown out on all the roads leading to it. By the aid of Sergeant Bradford, First Regiment Louisiana Infantry, who had been detailed to accompany me for that purpose, I established telegraphic communication with Louisville and intercepted a few messages passing to and from the enemy at that place, the most of which, together with those found on file in the office, I forwarded to you. Unfortunately the wires had been cut by our troops south of Cave City, and the operator at Louisville soon began to suspect that something was wrong; otherwise I might have obtained more valuable information.

On the morning of the 13th I made a reconnaissance of the country in the direction of Munfordville,and finding a mill near Horse Cave containing a considerable quantity of wheat I ordered the Tenth Mississippi Regiment (Colonel R. A. Smith) and Blythe's Mississippi regiment (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James Moore) up to take possession of it, with the view of having the wheat ground for the use of the troops. During the day I learned from intercepted dispatches that the advance of our army to Glasgow had thrown the enemy into consternation along the whole line from Louisville to Bowling Green, and that they were under the impression that the force occupying Cave City was 7,000 strong and was advancing on Munfordville, where they had a camp of instruction, from which place they were asking for re-enforcements and provisions.

Late in the afternoon I intercepted a dispatch from General Gilbert, commanding at Louisville, ordering transportation to be ready at 7 p.m. to convey Colonel Dunham's regiment, 500 strong, and five day's rations for 3,000 men to Munfrodville. About 9 p.m. I received a message from Colonel Scott, commanding brigade of cavalry, through one of his officers, to the effect that the force of the enemy at Munfordville was not more than 1,800 men, entirely raw troops, and that they were fortifying their position, but that the railroad and telegraphed had been destroyed in their rear, cutting them of completely from all communication and

re-enforcements,. He also informed me that he intended to attack them at daylight on the following morning, and desired that I would co-operate with him with a part of my force.

Relying upon the information thus received and that gleaned from the intercepted dispatches I determined to support him with my whole brigade, leaving only a sufficient force behing Cave City and its approaches, and accordingly moved out of the town at 10 p.m., and, after a march of 12 miles, I reached the enemy's lines in front of Munfordville at daylight on the 14th instant. The enemy's works, as I afterward found, consisted of three distinct parts. On their right was a range of rifle pits sufficient to contain 3,000 men, semicircular in form, and terminating on the extreme right in a strong stockade, which stood upon the brink of the lofty bluff overlooking Green River. About 100 yards to the left of this was another rifle pit capable of sheltering at least one regiment, and still farther to the left and upon higher ground stood their principal work, a regular bastion earthworks, in and about which were stationed about 300 men. The passages between these works were almost entirely protected from our fire by the nature of the