advance was repeated and the foremost files were within 25 yards of the ditch and pressing rapidly forward toward it when a fire from artillery was unexpectedly opened from a hill in our rear, the shells falling among our ranks. Supposing that the enemy must have established a battery in our rear I ordered the Seventh and Ninth Regiments to about-face and charge it. This order was promptly obeyed and these regiments were already within a short distance of the battery, which fell back before them, when I was informed that it was attached to Colonel Scott's cavalry brigade and had come up to our relief. I immediately halted the two regiments, intending to lead them again upon the fort, but unfortunately the other regiment, not understanding in the confusion the object of the movement which had been made and supposing that a retreat had been ordered, had fallen back. It being impossible to renew the attack at once under the circumstances, the whole force was withdrawn in good order to a position in the woods near that whom which they had made the attack. It was then 9.30 a.m.

A careful examination of the ground since the engagement has satisfied me that had we not been surprised and disconcerted by the unexpected fire from Colonel Scott's artillery in our rear this attack would have been successful. The enemy had in that work, as I have since learned, only about 300 men, who had been driven by our fire to hide themselves, while I had before it not less than 700 men, who were pressing forward toward it in the most gallant and determined manner. A few steps farther would have carried them into the ditch, and once taken close contest the issue could not be doubted. That work once taken and the rest lay at our mercy. Its guns could have been turned to rake the other works, and the remainder of the enemy's force would have had no choice but to surrender or be slaughtered.

Soon after regaining our position I had an interview with Colonel Scott, who said he had made repeated efforts to inform me of his presence and of his intention to plant his battery upon the hill from which it fired. Unfortunately none of them had reached me. He also stated that he was inclined to believe that the enemy would surrender if a demand was made upon them, from the fact that when he had approached the place on the afternoon of the day before from the opposite side of the river and demanded its surrender Colonel Wilder, the officer in command, had replied that he could not surrender to a cavalry force, leaving it to be inferred that he would surrender if attacked by infantry and artillery; and the repeated what his messenger had told me on the night before in reference to the destruction of the railroad and telegraph in their rear and the impossibility of their receiving any re-enforcements. At this suggestion I addressed a note to Colonel Wilder by Major [J. B.] Morgan, of the Twenty-ninth Mississippi Regiment, under a flag of truce, stating my strength and renewing the demand for a surrender, to which Colonel Wilder replied, saying that he had also been re-enforced since the engagement began and refusing to surrender, but proposing a truce to enable both parties to remove their dead and wounded. I acceded to this proposition, stating in my reply that I would take as much as might be necessary and would notify him of its conclusion. Copies of the notes which passed between us are herewith inclosed and numbered from 1 to 3.

Fatigue parties were immediately sent out to remove the head and wounded, but as tools for burying the former had to be obtained from the enemy, from whom I could get only a few, and as the latter had to be removed more than a mile in order to put them in comfortable quartermasters,

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