verbal message that by eating the mules we could hold out sixty days. But on the 12th of September Captain M. C. Garber, the able and energetic division quartermaster, informed me that it was impossible longer to feed the mules, and suggested that they should be sent toward the Ohio River by way of Manchester. For two reasons I decided not to do so - the hope that the mules could be converted into food, or it might become necessary to harness them to the cannon to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. But without forage the mules must soon perish from hunger and the air become pestilent from their carcasses.

At this time we had been six days without bread, and the mill at Manchester supplied but little more than sufficient flour for De Courcy's brigade, and no more wheat was to be obtained. The other supplies were rapidly being exhausted, and not one syllable of intelligence had been received sine the actinon at Richmond as to the position of Buell's army or as to what force was being organized in Kentucky under the national flag.

It was now certain that the enemy would not attack our position, and was it was equally certain that two weeks from that day we would not have the means of transportation for our cannon should the enemy continue to occupy our front. While in the Gap our position was one of comparative ease and entire safety. To evacuate was to brave the worst horrors of war and the chance of being taken at disadvantage by an overwhelming force of enemy. To hold the Gap until compelled by hunger to yield would have transferred to the enemy thirty-two guns, 14,000 stand of small-arms, vast magazines of ammunition, and palsied the arms of more than 10,000 brave men, who had been seasoned to all the hardship of war. I determined to convene a military council, and without expressing an opinion learn the views of my colleagues. Up to this time I had impressed upon the minds of my command the belief that under no circumstances would I evacuate, nor would I have ever done so had I not been convinced that it was the only wise course left open for me.

On the 10th of August I telegraphed General Buell that I had "about tree weeks' supplies for my entire command." On the 8th of August I telegraphed to Captain Brown, assistant quartermaster at Lexington-

Twenty-five thousand men are between this place and Knoxville, and they are constantly arriving by way of Dalton. The safety of this place depends upon the supplies which you can rush forward. Not a second is to be lost. Give us supplies and we will be regardless of the enemy's force.

The enemy gained our rear and cut off our supplies.

A council of war, composed of Brigadier-Generals Spears, Baird, and Carter, with Lieutenant Craighill as recorder, assembled on the 14th of September, and it was unanimously decided that we had only the alternatives of evacuation or surrender. Such was my own opinion;but I waited one day longer, in the hope of receiving intelligence which would justify our remaining in our position. No intelligence came, and I devoted very energy to secure a rapid and successful evacuation of the Gap. In this, as in all else, I was nobly sustained by every officer and soldier of my command. Evacuation was peculiarly trying to the soldiers from East Tennessee, but both Generals Spears and Carter, from that State, strongly advised that policy.

Captain W. F. Patterson, an officer of great merit, and of whose valuable services I have before spoken, under the general direction of Lieutenant W. P. Craighill, chief engineer, was directed to mine the road and mountain

63 R R-VOL XVI