distance of about 12 miles. It could only be reached by turning it to the south, while the passes to the west, by which our lines of communication would be exposed, were suitably guarded. The army was moving with that view, when I learned, on the evening of the 13th, at Danville, that the enemy was retiring from his position toward the south. Pursuit was immediately ordered for the purpose of overtaking or intercepting him if he should attempt to pass toward Somerset.

General Wood's division marched at 12 o'clock that night, and engaged the enemy's cavalry and artillery at Stanford at daylight the next morning. The remainder of General Crittenden's corps and General McCook's corps followed on that road and General Gilbert's marched on the Lancaster road. The enemy kept the road toward Cumberland Gap, opposing with cavalry and artillery the advance of both of the pursuing columns, which, however, progressed steadily.

At Crab Orchard the character of the country suddenly changes. It becomes rough and barren, affording scarcely more than enough corn for its sparse population, and the road passes through defiles, where a small force can resist with great effect a large one; where in fact the use of a large force is impracticable. The little forage the country afforded was consumed by the enemy in his retreat, rendering it impossible to subsist any considerable number of animals. The corps of General McCook and General Gilbert were therefore halted at Crab Orchard, while that of General Crittenden, with General W. S. Smith's division in advance, continued the pursuit as far as London on the direct road and on the branch road to Manchester.

I have not received the formal report of the operations of this corps, but the pursuit was conducted by its commander, according to my orders, with judgment and energy. The road was cleared of the trees felled across it by the enemy and his rear guard attacked successfully at several points. Some prisoners were taken, and about 300 head of cattle and other property, to no very great amount, captured.

It was not expedient to continue the pursuit beyond London, partly because, it was impracticable in a manner to afford any material advantage; partly because, without advantage, it took the troops out of the way when they were likely to be required elsewhere. They were therefore promptly turned upon other routes toward Tennessee. A portion were to be at Bowling Green and the rest at Glasgow on the 31st ultimo, and thence continue their march by certain routes.

In that position I relinquished the command of the army on the 30th to Major-General Rosecrans, in obedience to instructions from the general-in-chief. In the mean time the railroads, which had been broken up by the enemy and suspended for two months, had been repaired as far as Bowling Green to carry forward supplies.

I have no means at this time of reporting the casualties that occurred in the minor engagements or skirmishes that took place during the officers and soldiers engaged in them, as the subsequent movements of the troops and my separation from them have prevented me from obtaining detailed reports, except concerning the battle of the 8th. The particulars referred to outside of the battle are based on the brief and sometimes oral reports made at the time, and are unavoidably less complete and definite than I could wish. For the same reason many such I am unable to mention at all. In regard to the battle of the 8th, the reports of the several commanders go much more into detail than is necessary in this report, and I beg leave to commend them to your consideration, especially in relation to the services of many officers whose