Major-General Hardee that he did not regard the enemy in large strength near there (see Exhibit No. 2), I renewed early on the morning of the 7th the orders to concentrate all the forces in front of the depot at Lexington. (See Exhibit No. 3.) But before this order was put in full operation information was received that the enemy in limited force was pressing upon General Hardee at Perryville; that he was nowhere concentrated against us, but was moving by separate columns; his right (see map herewith, marked A*) was near Lebanon, a corps in front of Perryville, and his left (two entire corps) extending by way of Mackville to Frankfort, a line of a least 60 miles. This presented an opportunity which I promptly seized of striking him in detail. Accordingly written orders were given to Major-General Polk, dated Harrodsburg, October 7, 5.40 p. m. (see Exhibit No. 4), to move Cheatham's division, now at Harrodsburg, back to Perryville, and to proceed to that point himself, attack the enemy immediately, rout him, and then move rapidly to join Major-General Smith, as before ordered, and, it was added, "no time should be lost in this movement."

Meanwhile, during the same day, I had received repeated and urgent applications from General Smith (near Frankfort) by express, representing the enemy to be in strong force in his immediate front and earnestly asking for re-enforcements. Accordingly Withers' division had been detached and sent to him (before receipt by me of the information from Perryville), and was already for on the way thither at the time when the movement to Perryville was ordered, and this will account for my being without the benefit of this division in the battle which ensued next day at the latter place. Major-General Polk arrived at Perryville with Cheatham's division before midnight of the 7th and the troops were placed by General Hardee in the line of battle previously established.

Our forces now in this position consisted of three divisions of infantry (about 14,500) and two small brigades of cavalry (about 1,500). To this the enemy opposed one corps (Gilbert's), about 18,000 strong. Information reached me during the evening and night of the 7th at Harrodsburg which indicated that no attack could be made on General Smith's command the next day, and I immediately changed my purpose to join him and determined to go to Perryville. From unofficial sources I was led to fear the existence of serious misapprehension in regard to the position and strength of the enemy's forces near Perryville, as well as to the location of our supplies, supposed to be at Bryantsville, when in truth but two days' rations for the army had yet reached that point.

Having ordered the attack and that no time should be lost, I was concerned at not hearing the commencement of the engagement early in the morning, but was much relieved for the time by receiving from General Polk a note, dated Perryville, 6 a. m., October 8, informing me that the enemy's pickets commenced firing at daybreak and that he should bring on the engagement vigorously. (See Exhibit No. 5.) To my surprise, however, no gun was heard, and on my arrival, about 10 a. m., I was informed that it was determined not to attack, but to assume the "defensive-offensive." After a hasty reconnaissance and consultation orders were given for some changes deemed necessary in the line of battle; a portion of it being withdrawn was restored, and Major-General Polk was ordered to bring on the engagement. Impatient at the delay after this order I dispatched a staff officer to repeat it to the general, and soon thereafter I followed in person and put the troops in motion.

Major-General Buell, commanding the forces there in our immediate

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*To appear in Atlas.

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