compliance, and that if any other alternative than that of obedience to the order was adopted it might involve you and the forces with you near Frankfort in embarrassment, if not defeat; that in your dispatch you definitely stated that General Kirby Smith would attack the enemy then in your front, and that we must move through Bloomfield upon him and "strike him in flank and rear;" that in your contemplated attack you evidently relied upon co-operation, and that if we failed in that co-operation disaster might be the consequence. After other conversations, not now remembered, General Polk, again addressing me as the junior present, inquired what would be my advice in case there was no such order as the one referred to, remarking at the same time that you could not have had the lights before you at the time you issued the order which we had at that time, and that therefore the order should not be taken into consideration in making up our judgment as to what should be done. I replied promptly:

In that case, were there no order to the contrary, I should unhesitatingly recommend that we fall back to a more favorable position, to cover our depots at Danville and Bryantsville.

I understood that all of the other officers present concurred in that opinion. General Polk at once announced his intention to move in the direction of Danville. It is proper that I should state that he subsequently told me that he had received a dispatch from you the purport of which indicated the wisdom of the move he had determined on; remarked that it was fortunate that he had not obeyed the letter of your order. Of course at this late day, speaking from memory only, I cannot give more than the substance of conversations.

In regard to the action that was had at a meeting of general officers held about daylight near Perryville, on October 8, in which the "defensive-offensive" was adopted, I have no recollection at all. I cannot remember that I was present at any council at or near Perryville, except an informal one, composed of Major-General Hardee, Brigadier-General Wood, and myself, improvised on the evening of October 7, at which General Hardee, of his own motion, addressed you the note which I suppose is referred to in your communication to General Polk, dated Harrodsburg, October 7, 5.40 p. m. In that note General Hardee advised the policy of concentrating our forces before we made an attack. He read me the note after it was written and I fully concurred in the policy it advised. Your note just referred to I did not see nor was I made acquainted with its contents. Had I been present at a council on the occasion referred to, in the absence of orders to the contrary I think it quite probable I should have advised the "defensive-offensive" policy; but at this lapse of time I would not undertake to censure a different course.

Believing that throughout the Kentucky campaign, with the lights then before us, the best was done which could have been done under the circumstances, and having no disposition to cast censure now upon those whom I failed to find fault with at the time, I can only hope that the same army under its tried leaders may soon be permitted to repeat the experiments with better facilities and under more favorable circumstances.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

PATTON ANDERSON,

Brigadier-General.