said not; but I considered that a matter for the civil authorities to adjust, and he has been ejected by them. Major Thurneck held on to his house by false representations - that his children and wife were so sick that a removal would be at the risk of their lives. I finally sent a surgeon to examine. Upon his report of the facts I directed Colonel Campbell to have him ejected as occupying a house in possession of the United States without civil authority. He refused to obey the order. The order was reiterated peremptorily, and his lieutenant-colonel obeyed the order at once. I am sure that if any officer in the department not directly interested had examined the matter and reported my action would have been approved.

OLIVER D. GREENE.

CUMBERLAND GAP, July 17, 1862.

Colonel J. B. FRY:

On yesterday, in consequence of the serious illness of my wife, I had the honor to forward through your headquarters my final resignation and request to be immediately relieved. My last intelligence from my home induces me to respectfully request that Major-General Buell will by telegram recommend the acceptance of my resignation and relieve me from command.

GEORGE W. MORGAN.

CUMBERLAND GAP, July 17, 1862.

Colonel J. B. FRY:

COLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of yesterday.

I have now absent a force of 1,200 infantry, and expect its return to-morrow. at the earliest practicable moment afterward, in obedience to the instructions of the major-general, I will detach one brigade of four regiment at Barboursville, one at London, one at Mount Vernon, and one at Crab Orchard. This disposition will protect both the Crab Orchard and Richmond road, so far as infantry can give protection to a long line against the forays of partisan cavalry.

I believe that General Boyle lias a small force at the Kentucky River Bridge; a point of great importance.

To complete the chain Lancaster should also be occupied, but I am not aware whether General Boyle has sufficient troops for that purpose. Two reasons have prevented me from sending infantry to protect my line of supplies. The line is 150 miles in length, and the roads, even at this season, are so wretched as to render small trans absolutely necessary; hence it is impossible to furnish a sufficient number of infantry escorts to protect them, and I believe that infantry stationed at intermediate points cannot protect a long line against sudden forays of partisan troops, who will operate on interior by-roads; but my main reason was that I regarded Morgan's incursion as a probable diversion in favor of Smith, whose line is on the Clinch, and whole force is considerable greater than mile. On the 11th of May I made the suggestion as to protecting the line between Louisville and Nashville, not