gow, Ky., about a week ago [September 18]. The papers captured were copies of the originals sent by General beauregard to General Jordan to be entered.

JAMES B. FRY,

Colonel and Chief of Staff.

[Inclosure Numbers 2.]

MOBILE, ALA., September 5, 1862.

General S. COOPER,

Adjutant-General, &c., Richmond Va.:

GENERAL: Under the supposition that on the restoration of my health I would be returned to the command of Department Numbers 2, I had prepared, while at Bladen, Ala., a plan of operations in Tennessee and Kentucky, based on my knowledge of that part of the theater of war, but hearing that my just expectations are to be disappointed I have the honor to communicate it to the War Department, in the hope that it may be of service to you arms and to our cause. It was submitted by to General Bragg on the 2nd instant. By looking at the map it will be seen that the forces operating in that section of country will be separated a first river (the Tennessee) and afterward by two (the Tennessee and Cumberland.) Hence they will be unable to support each other, being unprovided with pontoon trains, but their operations must be more or less dependent on or connected with each other. I will first refer to those in East Tennessee an then to those west of it. In the first case our objective points must be first must be first Louisville and then Cincinnati. How best to reach them from Chattanooga with buell at Huntsville and Stevenson is the question. It is evident he has the advantage of two bases of operations-the cumberland and Tennessee Rivers- and that if we advance toward our objective points without getting rid of him we would expose our lines of communication with Chattanooga. We must then give him battle first or compel him to retire before us. Should he retire on Nashville (as the newspapers say he is now doing), we will be advancing toward Louisville, but should he retire on Florence or Savannah to unite his forces with Rosecrans or Grant, we will have to concentrate enough of our forces from Middle and East Tennessee to follow hi rapidly and defeat him in a great battle, when we would be able to resume our march as before indicated. We must, however as soon as practicable, construct strong works to command the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, for otherwise our communications would be cut off by the enemy as soon as these two rivers shall have risen sufficiently to admit the entrance of their gunboats and transports. The best position for said works is about 40 miles below forts Donelson and Henry, not far frog Eddyville, where those two rivers come within 1 1/2 miles of each other. I am informed there is at that point a commanding elevation, where a strong field work could be constructed for a garrison of about 2,500 or 3,000 men, who could hold out (with ample provisions and ammunition) against a large army. Under the guns of this work and along the bank of each river a series of batteries, armed with the heaviest guns (8,9, and 10 inch and rifled guns), could be constructed, bearing directly on obstructions placed in each of said rivers. When Louisville shall have fallen into our possession I would construct a work there for the command of the Ohio and the canal, and I would destroy latter as soon as possible so completely that future travelers would hardly know where it was. This I would do as a return for the Yankees' vandalism in attempting to obstruct forever the