embraced in Greenup, Carter, and adjacent counties of the rebel bands which are said to infest it.

The exact direction in which you should move depends so entirely upon the position and strength of the rebels that you must be governed by your own judgment. I suggest, however, that you confer with Colonel Erfut, of Kentucky, now at Portsmouth, who is connected with the Home Guards, knows the country, and is represented to be a reliable man. You should also communicate as soon as possible with Colonel J. Cranor, fortieth Ohio Volunteers, who is on his way into Northeast Kentucky from Point pleasant with a considerable force, and you will act under the instructions he may give you. You will make your reports to Colonel Cranor as soon as you can put yourself in communication with him. Until then you will report direct to these headquarters.

The nearest quartermaster and commissary will supply the necessary transportation and subsistence on your requisition.

You will afford every possible protection to the loyal people of Kentucky, who are represented to be suffering in person and property from rebel and guerrilla bands, and do this as promptly as possible.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. G. WRIGHT,

Major-General, Commanding.

WASHINGTON, October [24], 1862.

Major General W. S. ROSECRANS, Cincinnati, Ohio:

You will receive herewith the order of the President placing you in command of the Department of the Cumberland and of the army of operations now under Major-General Buell.

You will immediately repair to General Buell's headquarters and relieve him from the command.*

The great objects to be kept in view in your operations in the field are: First, to drive the enemy from Kentucky and Middle Tennessee; second, to take and hold East Tennessee, cutting the line of railroad at Chattanooga, Cleveland, or Athens, so as to destroy the connection of the valley of Virginia with Georgia and the other Southern States. It is hoped that by prompt and rapid movements a considerable part of this may be accomplished before the roads become impassable from the winter rains.

Two modes of reaching East Tennessee have been proposed. First, to push a small force on the rear of Bragg's army to drive him into Tennessee and move the main army on such lines as to cover Nashville; second, to go directly to Nashville and make that the base of your operations, by McMinnville or Cookville. Adopting the first plan, the route by Somerset to Montgomery, if practicable, would be the most direct; if not practicable, it would then be necessary to move by Columbia or Glasgow to Sparta, &c. If the second plan be adopted, you will be obliged to move twice the distance in order to reach your objective point and at the same time afford the enemy an opportunity to resumed his raids into Kentucky. Moreover, it would give the appearance of a retreat, which would encourage the enemy, while it would discourage our own troops and the country. Nevertheless, the difficulty or the roads, the pressure of the enemy upon Nashville, the position in which you find General Buell's army, and the difficulty of supplying

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* See Rosecrans to Buell, October 1862, p.635.

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