HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 2,
Harrodsburg, Ky., October 5, 1862.

Major General LEONIDAS POLK,

Commanding Army of the Mississippi:

GENERAL: The major-general commanding instructs me to renew the directions this evening communicated to you to concentrate your command at this point as rapidly as possible. He does not desire them to move to Danville, as he is withdrawing forces from there. Respectfully, general,

GEORGE WM. BRENT,

Chief of Staff and Assistant Adjutant-General.

FREDERICTON, KY., October 5, 1862-11.30 a.m.

Major General LEONIDAS POLK,

Commanding Army of the Mississippi:

GENERAL: I dispatched you at 1 a.m. this morning. Nothing from the enemy save that a lieutenant and 10 men (whom I had near Bloomfield last night) report the enemy moving from Bloomfield to Bardstown. The lieutenant and party are still near Bloomfield. General Hardee has ordered me to defend this road until his column passes through Springfield. One of my scouts has just returned and reports the rear of General Hardee's command 6 miles from Springfield and that Colonel Wheeler was 1 1/2 miles in the rear. In your dispatch of last night you use the following language:

On your arrival at Springfield you will establish of pickets out to Lebanon for the purpose of picketing said road to that place (Lebanon), thence picket the road along toward Danville from Lebanon, so as to fence off the enemy's cavalry from our right flank. At Lebanon, on to-morrow evening, you will find Wade's regiment of cavalry and your two companies that were sent to Columbia. You will assume command of these. Colonel Wheeler has instructions to protect the rear and left flank.

Do you mean for me to march with my whole command via Lebanon to Danville, picketing the roads mentioned in your dispatch?

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNumbers A. WHARTON,

Colonel, Commanding Cavalry Brigade.

HDQRS. TWENTY-FIFTH TENNESSEE REGIMENT,
Lebanon, Ky., October 5, 1862.

Major-General POLK:

My command of only about 375 effective men is ordered to remain here to protect the large amount of supplies and flour mills. I think my force is too small, as I am informed that your command is moving out from between me and the enemy, as there is required so much guard duty and also so much fatigue duty. In case of an attack the guard and fatigue men would be of little service, unless we should happen to get a long time to prepare. If you can send one regiment of infantry and one company of cavalry I think the force will then be as small as should be risked at this important place. The supplies are being conveyed away as fast as possible. Provisions are being gathered up from the country, requiring escorts to protect from Home Guards. As this