fields, through streams of water, and climbed hills, where it became necessary of call for a detail from the infantry to help us along.

On the 29th we took the direction of Murfreesborough, passed over a very rough and hilly road, and arrived after dark near the scene of the contemplated battle. The utmost caution and vigilance was ordered. We were hitched up and ready for action at daylight of the 30th.

On this day the Second Division was held in reserve. We followed the advance till late in the afternoon, when we were ordered to oblique to the right, to cover the right of General Davis' division. The enemy had posted a battery on the right of General Davis, in a handsome position, enfilading his whole line. General Kirk ordered me forward with a regiment of infantry as support, with instructions to silence, if possible the rebel battery. Under cover of a cedar thicket, I was enabled to approach within about 700 yards of the enemy. The battery was silenced by six rounds from our pieces. They retreated, leaving a caisson disabled. An attempt was made to gain another position, but we followed them engaging the infantry that came to their support, and kept up a brisk fire until dark. General Kirk the ordered us to case firing.

My battery was the only detachment of General Johnson's division engaged in the action of Tuesday, the 30th of December. I here represented to General Kirk that my men were very weary, my horses almost famished; that my ammunition was short in the limber-chests of the pieces, and asked permission to withdraw long enough to prepare for hard work on the following day. Believing horses to be the main dependence of a light battery, and not knowing when I should have I should have an opportunity to feed and water it brought into action, I asked time to prepare for the conflict of the morrow. General Kirk pointed out a spot about 100 yards in the rear of the position I then occupied,sheltered by a heavy growth of timber, and ordered to bivouac there for the night. I reported to him that I could not place my guns "in battery" there, or defend myself if assaulted. He replied that I should be protected, and that ample notice should be given when I was expected to take a position in the line of battle.

After I had brought my guns into park, the right of the brigade was thrown across the muzzles in front. General Willich's brigade marched up and formed on the flank. I found myself within the angle formed by the junction of the two brigades, retiring about 50 yards, and on a low and narrow piece of ground. I have before stated that it was dark when I arrived at this point. We were not permitted to have lights. The ground in our rear had not been reconnoitered. I rode back some distance, but failed to find water for my horses. I did not consider it safe to push the investigation far outside of our lines that night. I waited until morning. At daylight a small stream was discovered about 100 rods in our rear. It was quiet all along our lines. I could not hear a picket shot, nor any indication that the enemy was in our vicinity. I had no orders to take position. My horses were already harnessed, to hitch on at a moment's warning. I was completely surrounded by veteran troops. I had a right to suppose that our front and flank were so picked that I should have notice of the approach of the enemy. I ordered a half battery of my horses to go to water on a sharp trot, and return at the slightest indication of danger. The horses had barely reached the water when a fierce shout was heard at the front, and a terrible volley of musketry was poured in upon us. I called the cannoneers to their posts, had a half battery hitched in, put my guns in battery where they were, and a moment was prepared, as best i could, to fight in that position. The infantry, our support, gave way