party of 35 or 40 men charged upon the camp from our rear, taking us totally by surprise. Their movements were hidden by a ridge, and the darkness and high wind which prevailed aided their attack. Captain Gillmore sprang to his feet, and in attempting to rally his men, many of whom were asleep, was shot down and surrounded by a dozen mounted men. At the same time 6 men were wounded and 18 captured. As we were weakened by the absence of two reliefs the command was totally overpowered and at the mercy of the enemy. it is my opinion that they entered the line between Captain Gillmore's extreme left post and the right of the First Pennsylvania pickets, considerable distance intervening. This opinion is strengthened from the fact that there was not a shot fired on the line, and in the morning I examined the ground, finding a trail through the snow at the point designated.

They retreated out the Sulphur Springs road, carrying with them 18 prisoners, and 43 horses with their equipments, leaving 8 wounded, including Captain Gillmore, which comprised the whole command with the exception of 3 or 4 who escaped.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your, obedient servant,

G. S. LUTTRELL WARD,

Second Lieutenant, Third Pennsylvania Cavalry.

Major J. W. WALSH.

Numbers 4. Report of Major John S. Mosby, Forty-third Virginia Cavalry Battalion, including skirmish, January 10, at Loudoun Heights.

FEBRUARY 1, 1864.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following reported of the operations of this command since rendering my report of January 4;

On Wednesday, January 6, having previously reconnoitered in person the position of the enemy, I directed Lieutenant Turner, with a detachment of about 30 men, to attack an outpost of the enemy in the vicinity of Warrenton, which he did successfully, routing a superior force of the enemy, killing and wounding several, and capturing 18 prisoners and 45 horses, with arms, equipments, &c.

On Saturday, January 9, having learned through Frank Stringfellow (a scout of General Stuart) that Cole's (Maryland) cavalry was encamped on Loudoun Heights with no support but infantry, which was about one-half mile off, I left Upperville with about 100 men in hopes of being able to completely surprise his camp by a night attack. By marching my command by file along a narrow path I succeeded in gaining a position in rear of the enemy between their camp and the ferry. On reaching this point without creating any alarm I deemed that the crisis had passed and the capture of the camp of the enemy a certainty. I had exact information up to dark of that evening of the number of the enemy (which was between 175 and 200), the position of their headquarters, &c. When within 200 yards of the camp I sent Stringfellow on ahead with about 10 men to capture Major Cole and staff, whose headquarters were in a house about 100 yards from their camp, while I halted to close up my command. The camp was buried in profound sleep; there was not a sentinel awake. All my plans were on the eve of consummation