while Rosser, secured from view by the Patterson's Creek Mountain, was rapidly escaping through a parallel valley in the opposite direction. Before this error could be rectified the enemy was well on his way to Moorefield, and on the 3rd February, communication having been opened with the infantry under Colonel Thoburn, the whole force under command of Colonel Mulligan, started in pursuit, the cavalry, under Colonel Fitz Simmons, taking the old road to Moorefield and the infantry, with the artillery, following the new road west of the South Branch River.

On the morning of the 4th our advanced cavalry came in sight of the enemy in the Moorefield Valley. At this place, according to the report* of Colonel Mulligan, herewith transmitted, the enemy appeared in strong force with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and maintained a determined front for the evident purpose of securing the safe retreat of baggage trains and droves of cattle, which could be seen defiling by the roads leading southward over the mountains. Pressed by our artillery and advanced skirmishers, he retired through the village of Moorefield, but before our troops, already harassed by loss of sleep and worn down by forced marches, had arrived in sufficient force to justify a general attack, the enemy's trains were beyond our reach and his troops had gained the defile in the mountains, where he could not be attacked except at a great disadvantage, and from whence he could retire from position to position, inflicting serious loss upon an assailant with comparative safety to himself. As there seemed to be no adequate advantage promised that would justify so hazardous an attack, Colonel Mulligan followed the enemy slowly with cavalry and artillery until night.

On the following morning, 5th of February, ascertaining that General Early was still rapidly retiring toward Harrisonburg by the Lost River road and Brock's Gap, Colonel Mulligan ordered the co-operating forces back to their respective stations, and leaving Colonel Thoburn at Burlington, he returned with his own command to New Creek.

The principal object of the enemy in this movement appears to have been the capture of the garrison at Petersburg, and incidentally to collect supplies from the Moorefield Valley. His main object failed entirely, and the small amount of damage resulting [from] his hurried attempt upon the railroad hardly justified the hazard incurred. I do not think his falling upon the supply train was the result of any information received of its movements, but simply accidental.

The fact that citizen refugees brought the first information of the enemy's approach, and that cavalry scouts sent out for the express purpose failed to obtain any information on the subject, is highly discreditable to the officers conducting these reconnaissances. I have heretofore maintained the post at Petersburg for the purpose of protecting the fertile and populous valley of the South Branch from plunder and conscription by the enemy. The line of communication with its depot at New Creek is long and difficult and the position a good deal exposed. Yet such is the value of the district covered by it that I have thought proper to maintain it, an it is now abandoned with great reluctance, and I hope only for a time.

The officers and troops engaged in the operations above reported, as far as I am informed, have behaved with commendable zeal and

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*See p. 35.

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