vation would permit, and stationed the First Division a little way back, at the edge of the forest. On learning the above result, I repaired at once to the front, with instructions from the general commanding to withdraw our troops across the river if I deemed them in danger of being overwhelmed, or to push our advance farther if it offered prospects of success. I reached the ford about 3 p. m. and carefully reconnoitered the position of the enemy, under fire from his sharpshooters.

Morton's Ford is at the middle of a considerable bend in the river, whose convexity is turned toward us. The point of land opposite is about 1 mile along the stream, and rising gradually from the river it is seen and commanded for about half mile by the ground on this side. About 1 mile from the river a high ridge is found which, encircling the point at the ford, joins the banks of the river above and below, while at these points the enemy have complete command of the ground on this side of the river. This ridge is also generally wooded and strongly intrenched.

In these woods and behind these lines were two camps. He had complete control with his fire over the point of land our troops had gained on his side of the stream. Our troops then were in a kind of cul-de-sac - a focus of fire. I soon determined, from the appearances above described and the force of the enemy (see General Owen's report), not to advance farther, and to wait till night before withdrawing my command, as the movement of the troops drew the fire of the enemy's artillery upon them whenever attempted. About this time General Newton's command approached the vicinity of Raccoon Ford, in sight upon our right, and commenced with his artillery a demonstration against the enemy posted there. Just at dark the enemy commenced an attack upon our skirmish line, and one of his regiments assailed a house where the right of this line was posted, and took it. Our men, upon being re-enforced, retook the place, and the line was re-established. The enemy continued a very brisk musketry fire at long range from all his line around us, and as the curve of the path of the ball at the distance was greater than the slight undulations of the ground, this latter afforded little or no protection to our men. Holding their position bravely against the concentrating, plunging, and crossing fire, and replying as best they could to the enemy, mainly well sheltered, our men of General Hays' division lost about 210 in killed and wounded. While this was going on, General Webb's division was ordered by me to cross to General Hays' support. The firing ceased after about one hour's duration. General Webb relieved General Hays' troops, and they withdrew with their wounded and dead to our side. General Webb withdrew his division about midnight. We remained on the river bank in position all day on the 7th, and returned to our camp in the evening. General Hays, in his report, says:

If supported by our whole corps I have not the least doubt that we would have been enabled to capture the whole force of the rebels, including camp and artillery, with less loss than we have suffered.

Lest the sanguine opinion from so able and reliable on officer may occasion chagrin that we did not attempt more, I will state that the demonstration was made without any pontoon bridges being with us, and the river was cold and deep, and the ingress and egress from the water difficult, and that, although a foot bridge was immediately begun and pushed with energy, it was not passable till dark. It would have occupied most of the day to cross our troops by wading,