made to have the telegraph wire between Meadow Station and Richmond cut between dark and midnight of the 6th. By these means it was hoped to surprise the enemy's Battery Numbers 2, on the Bottom's Bridge road near Richmond, and occupy Capital Square in that city for at least two or three hours; detachments previously detailed and carefully instructed breaking successively from the main column, on entering, for various specific purposes. Of course the success of the enterprise was based upon the sudden and noiseless surprise of the strong picket at Bottom's Bridge, without which it would be impossible for cavalry alone to pass Battery Nol. 2. Colonel Spear failed to capture the pickets at Baltimore Cross-Roads, owing to the excessive darkness of the night, which unfortunately proved to be cloudy and rainy. He reached Bottom's Bridge, a distance of 51 miles, ten minutes before the time designated, but found the enemy there in strong force, with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. They had received notice some sixteen hours previously, as appeared from the testimony of various persons in the vicinity, including women, children, and negroes, separately examined, of the arrival near Williamsburg of accessions to our usual force, and had during that time been vigorously making preparations. The bridge planks had been taken up, the fords both above and below effectually obstructed, extensive earth-works and rifle-pits constructed, and a strong force of troops brought down by the York River Railroad, by which large accessions were still arriving.

The darkness prevented an attack till morning, when a detachment of the New York Mounted Rifles, under Major Wheelan, made a gallant but unsuccessful charge on the bridge by the only approach - a long causeway flanked on either hand by an impassable marsh. The enemy opened with canister, first checking and then repulsing the charge, with a loss to us of 9 killed and wounded and 10 horses killed. All our men were subsequently brought off, as well as the saddles and equipments. The river was reconnoitered both above and below for some miles, but at every possible crossing the enemy was found in force with newly placed obstructions. Three regiments of infantry were plainly seen, besides other infantry, which fired from the woods, where their numbers could not be ascertained. Four batteries of field artillery were counted, and at least one heavy gun was in position, its shot reaching the bluff on this side and falling far in our rear.

Our infantry had marched on the 6th 33 miles, arriving at New Kent Court-House at 2 a. m. on the 7th. After a halt of three hours I moved on with them rapidly as possible toward the firing at the bridge, which was plainly audible. At 11 a. m., knowing from the continued firing ahead that Colonel Spear had not succeeded in effecting a passage, and that even if now effected our object of surprising the city must necessarily be defeated, I sent him orders to retire, but kept pushing on to his support lest his condition might be worse than I supposed. The infantry had arrived within 7 miles of the bridge when it met the head of his returning column, and after hearing from him the full state of the case, I reluctantly felt obliged to retire my whole force, not feeling authorized to incur the loss necessary to force the position without any longer an ulterior object to justify it. The cavalry was suffered to pass ahead, except about 300 men of the Third New York Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, retained for rear guard.

At Baltimore Store the enemy overtook and attacked my rear