At the bridge on the turnpike, where it crosses the brook, a few of the enemy were met, who immediately retreated on the appearance of my advanced guard, who made 2 or 3 prisoners, and several who had hidden in the woods came out and gave themselves up.

The first line of works that we was on the south side of the brook, commanding the bridge and the ford, but were not manned. After crossing the brook my column moved forward on the pike, encountering no resistance until about 1 p. m., when they came within sight of a line of earth-works, stretching to the right and left of the road 2 miles from the brook, from which the enemy immediately opened with artillery. The position that they occupied was a good me. The county for 1,000 yards in front of the works was open and perfectly level, affording no cover or position whence our artillery could be used to any advantage. The approach by the road was defended by a section of artillery, having a perfect range of the whole ground, and also enfiladed by the fire of two guns on our right and four on our left, and it was impracticable from the nature of the ground to maneuver cavalry on either side of the road except as skirmishers, the fields being very soft and muddy, and intersected with wide and deep ditches.

I ordered the Fifth New York Cavalry to deploy as skirmishers on the right and left of the road, and to advance as far as practicable toward the enemy, and gave directions for the rest of my command to form, while I went forward to examine the ground. i concluded that the best method of attack would be to send forward a strong party of dismounted men on the left of the road, where they could for some distance be kept out of view by some houses that stood on that side of the road, and when they were well engaged to make a attack down the road covered by our artillery. An attacking force of 500 men taken from the different regiments of the command, armed with carbines, was formed and placed under the orders of Major Patton, Third Indiana Cavalry, who was instructed to keep well to the left and make a determined attack upon the earthworks on that side, and to gain, if possible, a position where he could bring his fire to bear upon the enemy's guns. The rest of the command with the exception of the Fifth New York Cavalry, who were deployed and had been ordered to advance simultaneously with Major Patton, were formed ready to charge as soon as the diversion I had intended could be effected.

Major Patton advanced with his men, and as soon as he got within range the enemy in considerable force opened upon him with musketry. I was soon afterward directed by the general commanding division to withdraw my men and take the road to the Meadow Bridges, covering the rear of the division. Major Patton, on coming back, reported that the enemy had exhibited a considerable any certainty what number he observed. The enemy on the falling back of my command threw out form their works about 200 infantry skirmishers, who were checked by my rear guard and make no further demonstrations.

As we were moving on the road to the Meadow Bridges Major Hall, who had been detached the previous night to attack the South Anna railroad bridge, rejoined my command, reporting that he had found the bridge, rejoined my command, reporting that he had found the bridges strongly with infantry and artillery, and he could not accomplish the objected for which he was sent.

I moved down the road to the Meadow Bridges, setting fire to the