clad was on the stocks at Edwards' Ferry, and advised the department commander in two communications proposing a raid to burn it. The reply (in September) was:

That the forces of the department will not permit of the proposed movement at present.

September 10, I asked for a small iron-clad.

November 15, 1863, I addressed Major-General Butler as follows, viz:

During a recent visit at Plymouth, I found the senior naval officer somewhat nervous in consequence of a report having reached General Wessells of an examination of the Roanoke, with a view to bring down a ram at Edwards' Ferry, some 12 or 15 miles below Halifax. All sorts of reports are put afloat for the purpose of influencing our operations. My latest advices are that she is not yet complete. Since assuming the command in North Carolina, I have kept strict watch over this matter, and frequently advised General Foster respecting the progress of the work on the iron-clad. I suggested the propriety of burning it in August, but the general did not feel very apprehensive, and replied that the troops at our command would not warrant the enterprise.

The fortifications at Plymouth have been pushed with great vigor, and I have added materially to the armament. A water battery is in progress for a 200-pounder rifle with a center-pintle carriage, which will complete the river works. While waiting for the 200-pounder I have moved a 100-pounder from Hatteras, which is the only available gun of the kind in North Carolina. I do not feel very apprehensive unless the ram moves in conjunction with a land force.

Doubtless General Foster advised you that he head withdrawn all the best and available troops in North Carolina. There is no reserve force here, nor in any of the sub-districts. In case of an advance upon the lines, the force would be quite too small for a proper defense.

December 26, 1863, I wrote Major-General Butler, viz:

If Longstreet is well provided for during the inactivity of Grant and Meade and the quiet of General Gillmore, some forces could be collected for rebel enterprises in North Carolina during our destitute condition.

After the attack on New Berne, about the 1st of February, I wrote as follows:

In view of the great interests at stake in the State, and of the smallness of the force for its protection, I hope one regiment of cavalry and a brigade of infantry may be sent to me. A large force is much needed, and should be sent, if it can be spared without jeopardizing public interests elsewhere.

February 13, I wrote, viz:

My information is of such a nature as to induce the belief that Jeff. Davis has decided upon recovering New Berne and the sounds, probably as a preliminary step to Lee's retrograde movement in the spring. Both rams are expected down the Neuse and Roanoke, in conjunction with land troops. It seems certain that the one at Kinston is intended to come down on the next high water.

February 18, I wrote, viz:

On receiving most reliable information of the organization of a naval brigade for opening these sounds with the aid of the rams in Neuse and Roanoke Rivers, I directed the blocking up of the Neuse with old hulks within range of our batteries. This work is now in progress. I then proceeded to Little Washington and perfected similar arrangements in the Tar River, and fully advised all the authorities of the rebel plans, and gave the necessary orders for foiling them to the extent of our means. Since my return I have examined men respecting the ram at Kinston, and their information is positive, reliable, and confirmatory of what I have advised you. The ram is to be sent down on the next high water. The engine has been taken from Pugh's Mills, and was once in a factory in this city.

February 23, I wrote, viz:

Your letter of the 20th has just reached me, and I agree with your views except in one particular, viz, I don't believe in the iron-clad. Hitherto it has been a question of iron and time. A communication from General Wessells of the same date