General Butler and Admiral Lee examined a courier of General Pickett's, and he was sent to me March 8. He stated:

Impression when he left was that New Berne would be attacked when the ram was done. General Hoke said it was a pity they had not waited for the ram, as New Berne might have been taken without trouble.

General Hoke placed 300 men at work on the iron-clads.

Major-General Butler wrote February 20, in response to this and much more information, viz: "I don't believe in the iron-clad. "

On the 9th March he wrote, viz:

I have laid your previous dispatches before General Halleck, and he tells me that he knows of no troops that can be spared for our department, so we must work along as we are.

On the 9th March he wrote as follows:

With the force you have, we shall expect you to hold North Carolina against all comers. Don't let the army get frightened at the ram. She must have at least 2 feet of water to float in, and with proper vigilance you can take care of her.

This command has been depleted from time to time, until on the day of the attack at Plymouth there were only about 10,000 men for duty in the whole district, scattered from the banks below Fort Macon to Plymouth, guarding long lines and many posts.

FORTIFICATIONS AND THEIR ARMAMENTS.

About the 1st of March there was strong reason to believe that an attack in conjunction with an iron-clad was meditated on New Berne. Works of vital importance were ordered, and a few rifled guns were called for to arm them. To the letter disapproving of these works as not required, I replied March 27, viz:

General Foster's plan of defense on my arrival (in August) depended upon the presence of a goodly number of gun-boats, which should command the interior of his flank works, Stevenson, Anderson, and Spinola, and sweep the ground in front of the cremaillere line, and also on the other side of the Trent about Amory and Gaston.

Upon calling his attention to the uncertain nature of the naval defenses he assured me that he would send six army gun-boats, and in a measure render the army independent. In view of this announcement the naval force was materially reduced, as well as the land force, and the expected army boats did not arrive. Under these circumstances I proposed a small work (Fort Chase) across the river, the strengthening of Anderson, and the short face on the water side of Spinola.

General Foster never expected a water attack, much less by an iron-clad (which he attempted to burn at White Hall), or he would not have made wooden gun-boats an important element in his defensive system. Consequently, when attack may be looked for by an army and iron-clad, some slight modifications are essential to security.

In the latter part of February two iron-clads were near completion, and all information from all quarters indicated a grand combined attack upon New Berne. The senior naval officer had some four gun-boats for this river, which he regarded as mere shells, and only fit for the Coast Survey service. For a few days the Eutaw was here. In the interviews with Commanders Davenport and Blake, both agreed that the shots from the iron-clad at the obstructions would pass through their steamers with the greatest ease. they also conceded that the Whitworth guns had far greater ranges than any at their command. Commander Blake assured me that he would take position on the right of the cremaillere line, and let the Eutawsink if necessary for the security of that flank. Under the circumstances I deem it judicious, in common with officers of rank, to attempt to hold that flank with earthen walls, rather than depend upon wooden ones.

The senior engineer traced out a small redoubt, using the old lines, and giving a face upon the river. It was done quickly. A 100-pounder rifle is in the salient, with two 32-pounders weeping the dead angle in front of the cremaillere line between the line of fire of Rowan and the river. The army and navy appreciate the importance of this work, which I brought to your notice on the 12th instant.