The report of the ambulance officer shows that we had at that time 113 ambulances and 247 men, this already giving this army corps, largely composed of hardy and enduring soldiers, seventy-five ambulances and 133 men more than we would have been allowed if the corps had been composed of full regiments of new troops of the same number of men.

It seemed to me that our ambulance train needed diminishing instead of increased of increasing, and I think so now. I earnestly recommend that General Orders, Numbers 85, be so modified as to adapt the ambulance train to the strength and necessity of my command.

Dr. Letterman's indorsement says:

I am of the opinion that detailing men for the ambulance corps, instead of diminishing the effective strength of this army on the battle-field, will increase it if (I italicize the if) the officers of the line will enforce the provision allowing no one but this corps to remove wounded.

Can such a provision be enforced? Articles 44, 50, and 52 of the Articles of War forbid a man leaving the ranks in almost all definable cases. But who can enforce it in the heat and carnage of a desperate battle? To send a good man at such a time after one who has run away would be to emulate the dog who dropped his meat in the stream and rushed after its own reflection.

I was aware that it has been claimed as one of the advantages of this extensive ambulance corps that it diminishes the amount of sneaking from the battle-field, if the officers of the line do their duty. It is supposed to operate, first, by taking from the men in the ranks all pretense for leaving, and, second, by having men for this duty wearing a special badge to assist the line officers in recognizing those entitled to carry off the wounded. In the confusion of battle, however, no badge will be easily recognized; the good men and officers are all looking to the front and fighting, and have no time to look after cowards in the rear. At such time these latter will not need a pretense to run away, and if in doing sot they carry off wounded men they perhaps save their self-respect as well as their lives, and do all the good they can. If they remain long enough to do this they do all they can be made to do, and the sooner they are gone the better. Nothing will keep men in the ranks in battle but a soldier's pride-the devotion of a patriot.

The battle of Gettysburg, where this corps repulsed the assault of the enemy only by sustaining immense loss, is certainly a place to point to where the line officers did their duty, if it can ever be said of any line officers. There, too, we had a special ambulance corps, and yet Surg. Justin Dwinelle, surgeon in charge of the Second Corps hospital, reports:

I think 1,000 a low estimate of the numbers of able-bodied men who found their way to the Second Corps hospital by the night of July 6 who had no business there, and ought to have been with their regiments.

I think, then, the ambulance detail as a means of increasing the effective strength of this army on the battle--field is a failure, even if the officers do their duty. But the whole basis of the argument supposes that we must remove pretenses from the men's thoughts in order to have them dow hat duty the Articles of War enjoin. Men should not leave the ranks if there were no ambulance corps, and those who will run away before the terrifying aspect of the enemy's charge will not be stopped by not having an excuse, nor by the dawn swords of their officers, nor even by the bayonets of a provost guard.