is accomplished it would seem advisable to make a combined naval and land attack on Fort Caswell, holding Wilmington with a small garrison well intrenched. Should it become necessary to besiege Fort Caswell, a sufficient force can be left for that purpose, while the main body is moved into the interior upon the communication of the enemy at Goldsborough and Raleigh.

Second. To concentrate at Norfolk and Roanoke Island, via Hatteras Inlet, troops and supplies, and from these two points make a rapid concentration at Winston, or some other point on the Chowan River, from which a quick movement can be made on the main railroad line of the enemy at Hicksford, or on the two points, Weldon and Gaston, on the Roanoke River; either of which points being held and intrenched with an accumulation of twenty to thirty days' supplies, the enemy would no doubt be forced to come down in force to attack us in our intrenchments, which could be held while such force as might be designated moves upon Richmond, or might possibly compel him to abandon Richmond and retreat via Danville. At all events it would force him into decisive movement of some kind, such as making an attack upon the main body of the Army of the Potomac, or a concentration with Longstreet in East Tennessee, or one of the two movements already mentioned; in either of which it would seem that the advantages are altogether in our favor, particularly as the veteran regiments of Grant's army will have returned before that time, re-enforced by recruits and new organizations to an extent sufficient to enable him not only to hold the very defensible positions now occupied by him in East Tennessee, but will also enable him to make such offensive movements as may be deemed proper.

To carry out either one of the plans herein suggested it would seem necessary that certain things be done, as follows:

First. All the old regiments and batteries of the Ninth Corps in East Tennessee that are entitled to re-enlist having exercised that privilege, it would seem proper that the few regiments that have served nearly two years, together with the batteries, should be allowed to return with the corps for this work.

Second. That, as far as possible, the old Third Division of the Ninth Corps should be reattached. A considerable portion of the regiments have re-enlisted and are now in New England, and will fill up more rapidly if they could know that they were to be reattached to the corps for an expedition.

Third. That the command of Colonel Howard, formerly known as the Marine Artillery, with the light-draught gun-boats now being built by Mr. Wiard, should be attached, at least temporarily. The command could be largely increased from the towns on the New England coast if an arrangement of this kind could be made.

Fourth. Inasmuch as I have no regiments in the Ninth Corps from Maine or Vermont, and but three from New York, it would seem advisable to commence the organization of companies enough for three new regiments in Maine, one in Vermont, and ten in New York. The plank for raising these regiments that I would suggest would be to only grant permits to parties to raise companies with the distinct understanding that no field officers are to be appointed until the companies are absolutely organized into regiments. I am satisfied from my experience in the North Carolina expedition that a most formidable force could be organized if these conditions are ful-filled, possibly not to the extent of 50,000 men, but to very near that number. At all events I feel confident that a force sufficient to ac-