In other words, gaining the intrenchments at Morton's Ford, with the whole army to follow it up, would have turned his intrenched position of the Rapidan and its appendages. Second, the condition of the roads, country, and weather during the time that co-operation with General Butler was proposed and executed was such as to render the secret and rapid movement of this army impracticable. Third, the dispatch from General Butler received Friday night requested that the demonstration by this army should be made the next day (Saturday), and without regard to the weather; it stated that he hoped to strike his point Sunday morning at 6 o'clock. The demonstration, to be in time for General Butler's purpose (and it was made for no other object), could only be effected by using the two corps nearest the Rapidan-the First and Second-without bringing in their detached brigades, picket guards, &c., and by leaving their camps standing, with guards, &c., and sending parts of two divisions of cavalry to make demonstrations on the Rapidan above and below, by which the operations would be prolonged through Saturday. Fourth, the requirements of General Butler, just stated, rendered it impossible to take advantage of a surprise at Morton's Ford if one should be made, since the army could not be got to the river in time, if, indeed, it was practicable to get it there at all. Fifth, the co-operation with General Butler spoiled the chance for a successful attack by giving the enemy proof that we could surprise them at Morton's Ford, and by indicating to them what they should do, by a new arrangement of troops and new defensive works, to prevent a repetition of it. They have already thrown up a new rifle-pit close to the ford. A mere cavalry reconnaissance last fall caused them to extend the intrenchments on the Rapidan up Mine Run several miles. A similar reconnaissance at an earlier day toward their left caused them to intrench the crossing of Blue River and make other defensive dispositions. Sixth, in my telegram to you of the 5th instant I stated, "Demonstrations in our front at the present time may, however, spoil the chances for the future. " The conditions of a successful attack, so far as they relate to the condition, position, and sense of security of Lee's army, existed already. The conditions relating to the state of the roads and the weather, which rendered it practicable to move this army secretly and rapidly to the Rapidan, did not exist, and until they did no plan of attack could be prepared with my view to its execution, nor could any time be proposed for its execution. It was believed, however, that the opportunity would occur.

JOHN SEDGWICK,

Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
February 12, 1864.

COMMANDING OFFICERS SECOND CORPS:

The major-general commanding directs that the picket-lines of the Second and Third Corps be so modified that the roads to Mitchell's and Raccoon Fords be picketed by the Second Corps.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.