I called attention specially to the subject in my reports of the battles of Chancellorsville and of Gettysburg. In the first battle, for the artillery of the army (412 guns, 980 artillery carriages, 9,543 men, 8,544 horses, besides their large ammunition trains, and these distributed throughout the army), I had but five field officers, and these, for the want of disposable battery officers, had miserably inefficient staffs. In the Gettysburg campaign, with sixty-seven batteries (372 guns, 320 of which were on the field, with over 8,000 men and 7,000 horses, and the necessary material pertaining to them), I had in the whole army but one general officer (commanding the artillery reserve) and four field officers. Of the seven corps present the artillery of three corps was commanded by captains, and that of one corps by a young lieutenant. Both brigades of horse artillery were commanded by captains. These facts need no comment, yet those only who were charged with the management of such a force with so little aid can fully appreciate the evils and difficulties to which they led.

Second. The force asked for as guards, &c., can best be furnished by assigning to this army two or three additional regiments of foot artillery, from which the details for all purposes can be made by the chief of artillery, and this arm be relieved from its present dependence on the infantry. The duties must be performed and men are required to perform them. It is now done by drawing from time to time regiments to serve as drivers and cannoneers in the batteries, to the injury of both branches of the service and a continual struggle and ill feeling between them.

Third. The assignment of these regiments of foot artillery will allow provision to be made for the third proposition, and if suitable regiments are designated will do much to correct the evils for which the first proposition provides.

Many of our best officers of field artillery have left that arm to accept the promotion in foot artillery and elsewhere that they could not obtain in their own branch of the service. If the regiments of such officers or regiments that could be raised by them (Lieutenant-Colonel Best, inspector-general, Twelfth Army Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, inspector-general, Second Army Corps, and Lieutenant-Colonel Platt, judge-advocate of this army, for example) were assigned to duty in the field, they would furnish them good chiefs of artillery and the necessary details, &c.

In relation to the use of caissons for ammunition, I inclose copy of a letter addressed by me to Brigadier-General Ingalls, dated September 30, 1863. * Each caisson for infantry ammunition will carry in its three chests as much ammunition as 6 horses can haul, and I think that 27,000 rounds can easily be packed in the chests. These caissons can be driven, guarded, and served by companies of foot artillery, and can be driven upon the field and regiments and brigades supplied whilst under fire. The want of such an organization is to be read in the reports of troops leaving the field for want of ammunition. By law chiefs of artillery of divisions and corps are ex-officio chiefs of ordnance for the troops to which they are attached, and the supply of ammunition on the field could be properly required of them if the means of performing the duty were supplied them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY J. HUNT,

Brigadier General, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac.

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*See Vol. XXIX, Part II, p. 237.

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