to you. The general thinks, however, that three engineers and thirty cars had better be returned to the railroad authorities, and he wishes you to return them. The engine and ten cars to be retained you will locate at such points as you may consider best.

S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CAVALRY DIVISION,
March 21, 1864.

Lieutenant Colonel C. ROSS SMITH,

Chief of Staff, Cavalry Corps:

You will receive early this morning 5 more prisoners, papers, and reports from Colonel Bryan. He reports no enemy west of the Rappahannock. My scouts confirm this report. No force near Fredericksburg save cavalry. Stuart is simply collecting his people from furlough; ordered to return on the 15th of this month. Colonel Bryan's command needs rest. I would respectfully suggest that he be ordered to return at the earliest practicable moment.

J. KILPATRICK,

Brigadier-General.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR OF ARTILLERY,

Washington, March 21, 1864.

General THOMAS,

Adjutant-General U. S. Army:

GENERAL: In obedience to instructions from Major-General Halleck, of the 18th instant, requiring me to report "what detachments can advantageously be made from the artillery regiments in the defenses of Washington to be organized into batteries for service in the field, and how soon such batteries can be prepared for service," I have the honor to submit the following report:

The entire artillery armament of the covering line of defense south of the Potomac consists of 450 guns. The full fighting complement of effective artillerymen required for this armament would be 9,450 men. The effective strength of artillerymen now on this portion of the lines is 7,988 men, being 1,462 below the full complement.

The entire artillery armament of the covering line of defense north of the Potomac consists of 410 guns. The gull fighting complement of artillerymen required for this armament would be 8. 610 effective men. The effective strength of artillerymen now on the portion of the covering line north of the Potomac is 7,587 men, being 1,023 men below the full fighting complement.

The Potomac River dividing the covering line would not render liable to a serious attack at the same time those portions of the line on the north and south sides of the river. I am of the opinion that the force on either side of the river could be thrown to the opposite side in less time than an attacking force could change its point of attack from one side of the river to the other. But from the character of the place covered the covering line has no moral strength unconnected with its fighting strength. The full fighting strength of the south side and the moral strength of the whole covering line might be retained by reducing the full fighting complement of the