which there was no chance of driving the Indians in, Captain Akey was directed not to leave till the 27th. The next evening (the 26th) another express arrived with the news that the long-settled and valuable ranch known as Bates', seven or eight miles from Arcata, on the principal thoroughfare to Fort Gaston, and the entire country to the north and east, had been attacked that same day by a band of thirty Indians, who killed Bates, fired a shower of bullets after the women and children, who had scattered into the woods on seeing their approach, destroyed his stock, and then burnt his house and outbuildings to the ground. As Bates' was on the direct route from this post to Angel's ranch, and as, from the information received, these Indians had moved in that direction, there was no reason for any change in the dispositions already taken, by which the troops were to concentrate at Angel's ranch at the earliest possible moment. The next morning (the 27th) I accompanied Captain Akey's detachment from this post to the scene of the outrages at Angel's ranch, passing by Bates'. Captains Akey's and Heffernan's commands arrived there at the precise moment designated. Captain Douglas arrived there an hour afterward, having been delayed by following up an Indian trail for some distance, but which he finally lost. After their arrival the three commands went on a scout in the neighboring woods, crossing them in different directions. But in the meantime a violent snow-storm had covered up all tracks that might have existed, and they returned to camp without having found any Indians or any Indian sign.

On the 30th I returned with Captain Akey's command to this post, directing the two other companies to proceed to their posts by circuitous routes and to follow up any Indian trails they might find. This they have done, but without success. At or near Angell's ranch, at Patrick's, and at Zehender's the Indians obtained, in all five guns, at Bates' seven, some of which were very superior fire-arms. I have sent instructions to Captain Johns, at Fort Gaston, to inform me at once, by express, of any positive indications of the Hoopa Indians preparing to urgently require it, to telegraph directly to your headquarters, by Weaverville, as this would save a delay of four days. I have also prepared a dispatch to Captain Stuart, at Fort Ter-Waw, to keep a strict watch upon the Klamath Indians and to report to me at once any hostile indications on their part. His dispatch I have not yet sent, as it is reported to be very doubt whether an express can get though by land, owing to the state of the trail, and the steamer being daily expected here, by which I can send it more surely and at a trifling expense. If the Hoope Indians should rise they will, no doubt, carry with them the Klamath Indians, their close allies. These tribes are said to be but one degree below our Eastern Indians in warlike qualities, but a very small proportion of them are believed to have fire-arms. What their numbers may be it is impossible to say, estimates very so much. Captain Johns supposes that the Indians in Hoopa Valley and its immediate neighborhood could turn out 800 warriors in forty-eight hours. Of course, if these Indians should rise I should require large re-enforcements. It would be well to send a few artillery soldiers with them to handle the two mountains howitzers, one of which is at this post, the other at Fort Gaston. Night before last the Indians burnt Cooper's flour mills, near Hydesville. They had pillaged them the week before, and had previously killed two of the Cooper brothers. As Hydesville is a small, scattered village, remote from military protection, with, no