the Texans then at Franklins, had I at once pushed on to that point; but the strong intimation not to leave Fort Thorn which I received from Colonel Chivington, and the positive order not to cross the river which I received from Colonel Howe, and my letter to him that I would await his further orders at Las Cruses, compelled me to remain at the latter place. Indeed, by moving farther down the river I would ave run counter to the expressed wishes of the district commanders of the Southern Military District of New Mexico, if not against their positive orders. On the 28th ultimo I received a positive order from Colonel Howe not to leave Las Cruses until further orders. Subsequently, while accompanying the general commandingon his march to Fort Quitman, I learned that Colonel Steele greatly feared he would be overtaken by the California troops, and in his hurried retreat burned a number of his wagons and destroyed a large amount of ammunition. I also learned that so much were his men disheartered and so thortoughly disorganized,een attacked by even a small force they would have at once surrendered. Certain it is an opportunity would have been given them to do so had it not been for the orders received from Fort Craig, for I should certainly have followed ad as certainly overtaken them before they left the river at Fort Quitman.

I am, lieutenant, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. E. EYRE,

Lieutenant-Colonel California Volunteer Cavalry.

Lieutenant BENJAMIN C. CUTLER,

Actg. Asst. Adjt. General, Column from California, Franklin, Tex.

Numbers 4.

Reports of Captain Thomas L. Roberts, First California Infantry.

SAN SIMON STATION, July 19, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: You will please to bring to the notice of the general commanding the following;

I have found the Apache Indians hostile, as will appear from my journal remitted this date. In both engagement we killed in all 9 that can be accounted for, but I am certain that we sent more of them to their long home. They attacked Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre's command, as is evidenced by the graves. I suffered, altogether, the loss of 2 privates killed, and 1 private and 1 teamster wounded. I deem it highly important that a force sufficient to hold the water and pass should be stationed there, otherwise every command will have to fight for the water, and, not knowing the ground, are almost certain to lose some lives. I would have remained there had my orders not been positive to proceed to this post. My excuse for not informing the general commanding at an earlier moment is this: I did not deem it safe to send a small party, and to insure the safety and success of the expedition I needed every man I had. I do not deem it safe to send the train with the entire of Captain Cremony's command as an escort, consequetly send twenty infantry in addition; as I have got the train safe here, I am determined to do utmost to have it return safe, which escort will accompany it as far as the San Pedro, and will leave it discretionary with Captain Cremony, when he arrives there, as to whether it will be necessary for him to go farther. I would call the attention of the general commanding to the conduct of my entire command during the march, and in overcoming difficulties attending the same. Every one, both officers