chronic warfare-the Indians or the whites-is entirely immaterial. It is plain that they never can live together in peace. The Indians must be all removed for their own sakes and for the sake of the whites, and the sooner they are removed the better. The Klamath, the Nome Cult, and the Mendocino Reservations are all too near. The Indians carried thither have all soon returned to their usual haunts-at least all the wild and more dangerous ones-and these return worse than they went, having acquired the taste for beef and learned to covet many articles they were before ignorant of. If they could be all trnasported to the Tejon Reservation, or, still better, to one of the Santa Barbara Islands, they could never rerturn hither again. The only question is how to brig them in. This can never be done, in my opinion, by isolated operations by independent detachments-at least it would require years to do it, the sacrifice of many lives, and of much treasure. I have not yet had time to consider the subject maturely, but I cannot held thinking that the object might possibly be accomplished in a certain way in a very short time-say three months. My plan would be a general and vigorous campaign, combined as follows: The Coast Range which bounds this district on the east is in winter covered with snow, which is so deep in all the passes inot the Scramento Valley as to constitute an impasasable barier on that side. In the ocean the Indians would have an impassable barrier on that side. In the ocean the Indians would have an impassable barrier on the west also. If while one body of troops was marching southwardly from the north in as many detachments as the number of trails or the nature of the country might require, anotyher body should advance to meet them in a similar manner from the south, say from Sonoma and Napa Counties, the Indians (except a few straggling parties that might escape through the intervals, and whose subsequent capture or destruction would not reuqire much time or effort) would be completely hemmed in, and would be obliged to surrender, whether with or without fighting, and in either case the object would be attained. A small number of troops would probably suffice to watch the few practicable passes that might exist in the Coast Range. By means of the telegraph, which extends as far north as Weaverville, Trinity County, only about 100 miles from this place, the operations of the different corps could be easily combined. If operations be delayed till spring, when the Coast Range will be clear of snow, a much larger force will be required to guard the passes on that side. As to what number of troops would be required to carry this plan into execution I will be better prepared to report when the traveling shall be sufficiently improved to enable me to reconnoiter the country. To save time some other officer might be employed to recnnoiter the soutehrn portion of the district. I would respectfully suggest that between this plan and the passive policy of posts, which can only keep the evil to a certain extent in check without eeradicating it, there is no alternative. The weather has now become f it should continue so for two or three weeks it might be possible for troops to take the field. Britton & Rey's map of California of 1860 was tolen from me on my arrival here. I have sent down for anohter one. Meanwhile if you can send me a topographical or other full map of this section of the country it would be highly useful to m. e

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS J. LIPPITT,

Colonel Second California Vol. Ifty., Commanding Humboldt Mil. Dist.

P. S. -Off course, against a civilized foe acquainted with the art of war the plan proposed would be very faulty, involving double exterior lines of operation and exposing the two corps to be beaten successively.