his tribe, so far as he can, from committing any depredations or hostilities. The few old residents here I have conversed with agree in the opinion that neither these Indians nor any of the others can be brought in willingly to go upon the reservations. Nothing short of actual force will do this, unless sit be an impressive exhibition of it. The Indians have been so often told that the whites were coming in great force "to wipe them all out," without ever seeing any other fulfillment of this threat than an occasional raid by a party of armed citizens, effecting nothing but the slaughter of a few among them, mostly women and children, that they have become stubbornly incredulous on the subject. It is highly desirable to avoid the bloodshed that would be caused by a resistance on the part of the Indians. There is no more likely way of doing this than by making such a display of force as to show resistance to be useless. On the other hand the chances of success in the entire cmapaign would be much increased by striking a vigorious and effective blow at the outset. The wisest course, therefore, I conceive would be as follows: Suddenly concentrate at Fiort Gastona force of, say, 600 men, rgulars and volunteers, but all having the prestige of regulars in uniform, drill, and discipline, the force to include a company of cavalry mounted and the mountain howitzer now at this post, with a detachment to work it. Immediately have a field day to w hich invite the meau-we-ma at Hoopa Valley and as many of his tribe as would come. Exercise the troops before them in some showy and striking maneuvers, battalion and skirmishing, including a few fires with blank cartridges, and the desicharge of a few shells by the howitzer. After this display of what to them must appear an irresistible force, the whole tribe, at least all the Indians in the valley, would probably yield to the evident necessity and come in, on being told that if they did not the entire force would be used to bring them in. But if they should show a disposition to resist or to hesitate they would find the outlets of the valley already secured by detachments of cavalry, and whather they resisted or not, the result with such a force as I have named would be equally certain. The moral effect of thus at one blow reducing to submission the most warlike of the tribes would contribute powerfully to our success with the inferior races to the south of them, and when combined with the pressure of the column from the south, making them realize that they were hemmed in on all sides by a superior force, would probably induce them to submit without resistance. But whether they resisted or not, the final result would be the same-they would be all brought in. As to the troops to be sent here in the event ofa campaign, I shall not presu, e of course, to offer any suggestion, though I should naturally prefer the six companies of the Ninth Infantry at the Presidio, and my own company (G), at Alcatraz, if it could be spared, with one mounted company of the Second Cavalry. If Captain Moore's company at Fort Bragg should be left to co-operate with the southern corps, these re-enforcements, together with the six companies already in this part of the district, would amount in all to fourteen companies, and making all deductions for garrisons, &c., at least 600 men in the field. The next question is as to the disposition to be made of the Indians when brought in. On one point all opinions here are unanimous. If taken to any reservation in this part of the State, all the more turbulent and dangerous among them will soon find their way back to their usual haunts. This I am told has always been the case, whether taken to the Klamath, the Nome Cult, or the Mendocino Reservations (I have marked on the plan the place as near as I ascertain it of erach of these reservations with a small dotted cricle). A resident near the