two months or more in the winter season, and there was no surplus subsistence at Fort Bragg on which they could draw, and in the valley itself they could obtain nothing by purchase but meat and bread. For these reasons I determined to await the arrival of the Panama, due here on the 22nd of October, with the expectation of being able to send the company and their supplies and baggage by her on her down trip to Fort Bragg, which is within four days' march of Round Valley, where they would have arrived, if no unusual delay had occurred, by the 1st of November, instead of the 10th, and, as was supposed, at considerably less expense to the Government. But Panama did not arrive till several days after she was due, and no arrangement could be made with her for the transportation of the company. On ascertaining this I directed Lieutenant Swasey, regimental quartermaster, to charter the steam-tug Mary for the purpose, which was done on the 29th of October for the agreed sum of $700. From that date the tug kept us waiting under various prtexts from day to day until the 13th instant, when I was informed that she would take the company on board in the afternoon without fail, agreeably to my letter to you mailed in the forenoon of that day. As she again disappointed us, I directed the contract to be thrown up and another vessel to be chartered, and on the 14th instant Lieutenant Swasey chartered the schooner Dashaway for $1,000 (lighterage at Fort Bragg not included). She was ready to leave immediately, but it was not till yesterday that the tug could be got to tow her over the bar. If there should be no further cause of delay the company ought to arrive in Round Valley by the 27th instant. They have with them about eighty days' rations, which ought to carry them through the worst part of the winter. Early in September last, when the contractors for the overland mail from San Francisco applied to me for two detachments of ten men each, to be posted during the winter at the two mail stations of Larrabee Creek and Fort Seward, I told them I considered such detachments entirely too small for safety; that I would prefer posting a whole company at one of these stations, detaching from it twenty-five r thirty men, with an officer for the other, and that I expected to be able to do this. Since then I have heard nothing further from these gentlemen, and under present circumstances I rather doubt the expediency of sending a force to those two points for the following reasons: First. It would be rather for the individual benefit of the contractors than necessary for the public at large, since there is another mail route be the way of Sacramento, Weaverville, and Fort Gaston, at all times about as expeditious, and in the winter season much more reliable. Second. Guarding two of the mail stations on the route would be but imperfect protection, as the Indians must be expected to attack those left unguarded. Third. TEn men, or thereabouts, under a non-commissioned officer at each station would be in imminent danger of destruction, especially considering that a portion of even these must be expected to be occasionally absent from the post in quest of game or for purposes connected with their duty. There should be at least twenty or twenty-five men at each post under a commissioned officer. Now the only company in that section of the country is Captain Flynn's, at Fort Baker, and such detachments from that post would virtually destroy it by leaving it barely enough men for a camp guard. This would deprive us both of the services of one company for the winter's scouting, and of the benefit of Fort Baker as a post, which has been proved by experience to be the most important pivot of operations against the Indians in the district. About 750 of the 835 Indians sent to Smith's River were captured by detachments