graph that I considered it unadvisable to follow them with my small force, fearing that the road east of Fort Rankin might be infested by them during the advance of my command should I pursue them. On reflection deemed it not impracticable to obtain additional forces from Laramie and increase my command to a numerical strength sufficient to punish the Indians if met; and learning from the scouts out that the enemy was evidently passing round to the north of Laramie, I applied to district headquarters for permission to send an express to Fort Laramie with orders to have the troops of that post co-operate with me in a combined movement against these Indians, intending to extend the pursuit as far as Horse creek if necessary where it was supposed by those best informed in Indian habits that the enemy would move to. In answer to my request, the general commanding district informed me his instructions were such as prevented him from granting my request and directing me to repair the telegraph line. After some further correspondence by telegraph on the subject of repairing telegraph lines I set to work with my whole energy to replace the broken portions of the lines, which were found to be most effectually destroyed; the poles being cut close to the ground and carried off, while the wire was twisted and entangled in the most inextricable manner, a large portion of it being carried away. I sent to Cottonwood for poles, whence I obtained 315 on the 10th instant at 4 a. m., Captain Kuhl, First Nebraska CAVALRY, having by superhuman exertion procured poles and wagons, and forwarded them under orders to march day and night. At 8 a. m., 10th instant, I started out the poles on both lines, the repairing party on the Denver line consisting of 100 men and two pieces of artillery under command of Captain E. B. Murphy, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, the artillery being commanded by Lieutenant Eugene F. Ware, Seventh Iowa Cavalry. The command on the Laramie line consisted of Captain John Wilcox, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, and 100 men and one piece of artillery, whom I had sent out twenty-four hours previously to dig holes for poles on that line, and Captain Weatherwax, First Nebraska Cavalry, and 100 men with one piece of artillery accompanying poles.

All the wire I had obtained up to this time was insufficient to fill the gap on the Laramie line, and I directed a party to proceed to Mud Springs, seventy miles west of Fort Rankin, on Laramie road, to telegraph for the necessary wire to be sent from there, with instructions to march it day and night to the broken line. On the 11th instant I was informed by my troops on Laramie road that Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, commanding Western Sub-District of Nebraska, had fought the Indians on 4th instant at Mud Springs; had skirmished with them until the 9th instant, when he left them at mouth of Rush or Willow Creek. The families and plunder had evidently crossed the North Platte at mouth of Rush Creek, where the ice was carefully sanded to enable cattle to cross, and the warriors or fighting parties of Indian force were loitering behind to defend them and check pursuit. I confess that I then regretted deeply that I had not moved my whole force in that direction, as I had at first desired, for I felt that, in connection with Colonel Collins' troops, we could have punished these Indians severely and probably retaken a good portion of the stock and property they had carried off. I, however, confined myself to the task assigned me, and, by dividing each repairing party into a day and night corps, succeeded in completing the circuit on the Denver line on the 12th instant, and on Laramie line on 17th instant. The heavy wind-storm of the 16th instant injured the line at the crossing of South Platte, which was repaired and communication opened with California