fallen braves. Larger detached parties showed themselves on the adjacent hills, and upon advancing the command in their direction, I discovered that there were many hundreds in the ravines beyond who had until then not shown themselves. Whilst in person on the west side of camp I discovered that large bodies were moving up the valley toward the south, and also that there was a very considerable force on the east bank of the river. Captain Boardman, with his company (M, Second Missouri Artillery), had been stationed in the woods along the bank of the river and covered the rear of the camp, whilst the Twelfth Missouri Cavalry occupied the right flank, the line of the Second Missouri Artillery extending to the corral of the commissary train on the left, with parts of three companies from the train to the woods. The company teams of the Twelfth Missouri Cavalry were formed in line perpendicular to the left of this regiment and extended from the section of artillery to the woods. The Indians made efforts to attract small parties of men from camp in pursuit of bands of from 10 to 100 of their numbers, repeatedly charging up within 250 yards and rapidly moving away again. Frequent attempts were also made by them to get at the horses of the men who were on foot in skirmish line, but the excellence of the Spencer arms and the promptness of the men, who gallantly met and repulsed them, though frequently outnumbered twenty to one, defeated their attempts in this quarter. In this desultory manner the engagement continued for some three hours, until a dash was made upon a detachment of the Twelfth Missouri Cavalry, who without orders had crossed the river. When attacked they very improperly turned to gain shelter, but the superior condition of the Indians' horses enabled them to overtake the broken-down horses on which they were mounted.

The carbine is an unwieldy arm to handle when on horseback, and cannot at close quarters compete with a well-handled pistol, but against bows and arrows in the hands of men who can use them with the most surprising rapidity they are entirely useless. This detachment was driven into the river, with the loss of 2 men killed and 2 wounded. They only escaped annihilation by the prompt action of Captain Boardman, who moved a portion of his company to their support, and by well-directed volleys drove the Indians back with heavy loss. The number of Indians in this charge could not have less than, 1,000. All the hill-tops, divides, and margins of the nearest bluffs were literally covered with Indians, whose savage yelling was distinctly heard above the noise of the immediate conflict. On one hill a large number of them had collected; a red flag and the constant use of their signal glasses (a piece of looking -glass flashed in the sun) denoted it to be their headquarters. I opened with shell upon this particular spot, and although not doing any serious damage caused the evacuation of this and all points within the range of my guns and a cessation of attack on the part of the Indians, most of whom retired out of sight and could not be induced to remain within reach of any of the detachments sent in pursuit. Finding myself unable with my exhausted and broken-down stock to gain my adequate advantage by remaining longer in this position, I moved up the river to the first spot at which I could find grass, a distance of twelve miles. After getting into camp a signal station was establish on a high bluff near camp overlooking, the surrounding country, and from if I was in constant receipt of information of the movements of a small band, probably twenty-five in all, who were following in my trail. They made no attempt at approaching nearer than a mile and a half, and warily avoided attack by small detachments sent after them.