through proper to give, a large number of persons engaged in the cultivation of cotton and sugar. Protection leases and registers were extravagantly issued, and in many commencement of the rebellion, been within the limits of permanent occupation. Three classes of persons were engaged in these operations: (1) Loyal and respectable men from the North, who embarked their capital and labor as a permanent investment, and a part of the original planters who submitted themselves cheerfully to the change of circumstances. (2) Dishonest and unprincipled men who engaged in it for the opportunities in afforded for illegal trade with the enemy, or with the hope of securing large gains easily and rapidly. (3) A large part of the original planters who accepted the conditions imposed by the Government with the expectation that our occupation of the country would be temporary, and that they would be able in the end to secure not only their plantations but their slaves. The withdrawal of a large part of the force in the Valley consequent upon the operation of Generals Grand and Sherman has prevented the protection that was proper, and appears to have been promised, and exposed the first class, except those in the immediate vicinity of military posts, to raids of the enemy, who find in these plantations a convenient source of supply for many of their wants. The restriction upon trade and the general failure of the crops throughout the Valley has disappointed the expectations of the second class, and a majority of them have abandoned the plantations they had leased, leaving the negroes to run at large or throwing them back upon the Army of Treasury Department for care and support. The third class, disappointed in their expectation of seeing the Valley reoccupied by the rebels, have left or are preparing [to] leave for points within the rebel lines, taking the negroes with them for the purpose of reducing them again into a state of slavery. The subject is one of grave difficulties. As at present managed it has not realized the results that were anticipated either for the Government of for the planters, and has greatly embarrassed military operations. Complicated as it is with the future of the negroes, I regard it as one of the most difficult problems we have yet to solve. It is idle to expect that until the strength of the great rebel armies is effectually broken troops can be spared for the purpose of giving protection to these interests to the extent that it is asked for by the planters and demanded by a proper regard for the welfare of the colored laborers on the plantations

As a question of the private interests of the planters it is of subordinate importance, but, as a question involving the future welfare of an entire race, it should be second only to the measures that are necessary for the suppression of the rebellion. Regarding an increase of the force in this command as out of the question until the more important result are attained, it is important to determine what other measures can be adopted that will best meet the desired end. The policy to be adopted should be adopted by higher authority than that of the military commander, in order that it may be secured from the danger of charge with every change of command. The course that seems best calculated to work good result is that of subdividing the plantations and thus multiplying the interest with them for the purpose of attacking an active, enterprising, and arms-bearing population, and the establishment of a system of military colonies capable of protecting themselves against anything except an organized invasion. The colonists should be put into military organization, armed and equipped at the expense of the United States, and mustered into its service for