I been possessed of certain facts from reliable souses when I assumed command of this district on the 4th of January, but a little over a month ago, it might have been possible to arrange matters so as to have fended off part, at least, of the present troubles, which will have (if not, indeed, already) one good effect, viz, to change the policy of the Government respecting the treatment of the Indians on the plains. Whatever may have been the origin of the present difficulties, whether the white men or the red were the aggressors matters not now. We are in every respect the superior oft he Indians, and can afford to wage a war of their own choosing, even to extermination, when I assumed command of this district there were but about 200 men all told, and they were scattered over an area of 300 miles, and yet with this command I was expected to protect the route from Denver to Julesburg, a distance of 190 miles, wile only 40 of the 200 soldiers were on that line, stationed forty miles from Denver. The balance were on the Arkansas River and at Fort Garland. My district extends about sixty miles on the Overland route from Denver, and yet I am called upon to protect as far as Julesburg, in the northeast corner of Colorado Territory, with no troops at my command, while on the north there are plenty, as also from Julesburg to Kearny, which, in my opinion from what I have seen of them and heard from reliable sources, had better be sent to some new field of operations. I have special reference to the stations from Kearny to Julesburg. I cannot say who is to blame for this, but it is not the less true. I see every reason why the District of Colorado should embrace the Territory, and none for it being as it now stands defined. Forty Lyon was not in my command when I arrived here, and has but lately been added, which gives me about 250 more effective men in the district, but not for operations on the Overland route, as they are needed in the southern portion oft h Territory to protect the About the end of December, 1864, the Third Regiment Colorado cavalry (100- days' men) were mustered out of service, thus denuding the district of troops, and at a time, too, when the Indians had suffered an overwhelming defeat or been subjected to a wholesale massacre at the hands of Colonel Covington, then commanding district 9 I give you these distinctions, as the people here are divided on the question); at a time when the Indians w ere burning for revenge on the white men, women, and children, in retaliation for the same killed by Colonel Covington commanding (for it is useless to hide this fact); at a time when the severity oft he winter prevented the making of a campaign with any hope of success on our side, even had the troops been at my command. In view of these facts, and knowing as he did that the Territory would be exposed to Indian assaults and depredations while denuded of troops, I question much the policy and propriety of the Sand Creek battle fought by Colonel Covington on the 29th of November, 1864. This matter is now under investigation by a commission appointed under instructions from Major-General Curtis, so that in course of time it will speak for itself.

After having become possessed of all these facts I looked around to see what could be done in the premises to save this country. I first made a statement to Major-General Curtis (which, by the way, has never been acknowledged), and impressed upon him the necessity for making certain changes and of hurrying out re- enforcements. Finding no response or relief from that quarter, I next called upon the governor regarding the turning out of the militia, which was deemed impracticable owing to the fact that the law has so many defects. I then suggested to the legislature, which was in session, the propriety of