HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Saint Louis, Mo., March 6, 1865.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: I transmit inclosed letters* from Major-General Dodge, commanding Department of the Missouri, in relation to the position and strength of the forces under Price in Southwest Arkansas and the Indian country, and the supposed destination of these forces in the spring. This information corresponds in all respects with that given me by the commanding officer at Fort Smith and by spies and scouts from Southern Kansas. There is little doubt that as soon as spring opens and grass is sufficiently advanced for stock these forces under Price will attempt a raid northward. Southern Kansas is most easily accessible, and as it is full of stock, and possesses many valuable farms it offers a tempting prize. It is possible, however, that the raid may be made into Missouri. Nearly the whole force under Price is cavalry, and it is altogether probable that in such a raid cavalry alone will be used. The second letter of General Dodge sets forth the entire force at his command, both in Missouri and Kansas, to defeat such a movement. It is unnecessary to point out to you how insufficient it is for the purpose. It is also needless to tell you, as you are entirely familiar with this region of country, that the proper position of troops to cover Missouri and Kansas and to intercept any invading force is some point on the Arkansas River, and at such a point all or nearly all the troops in Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas intended for the purpose ought to be concentrated. From the direction of Arkansas two routes of invasion of Missouri only are practicable; first, the route through Southeast Missouri, pursued last year by Price; second; the route through Southwest Missouri. These two routes are a long distance apart, and are separated from each other by rugged and difficult country. Of course, the common point of departure of these routes on the Arkansas River is the proper position for troops to intercept a movement of the enemy north; first, because the invading force would be met at the outset, and second, because the force which then woulto deal with them need be only one-half as strong as would be required to defend these two routes, if posted in Missouri or Northern Kansas I do not know what force remains in the Department of Arkansas, how it is disposed, nor what resistance if any, it would make to any movements of the enemy toward Missouri or Kansas. If Arkansas belonged to this division I would at once send al the troops possible from this State and Kansas to the Arkansas River and concentrate them with the troops serving in Arkansas. This combined force, properly disposed, ought to be able to cover all the country north of the Arkansas River. Under present circumstances there can be no co-operation between troops in this division and the Department of Arkansas, and I do not at all know what to expect in the way of assistance from that department. I think your experience in command here has made it clear to you that in a military view Arkansas properly belongs to the same command with Missouri and that a separation simply weakens the defense of both by preventing a concentration of forces for a common object under a single commander. I have written to General Reynolds on this subject, but as I cannot control the disposition nor movements of the troops under his command I must adopt every precaution that would be necessary if he were not in Arkansas at all. It is not probable that any movement north will be made by Price before April 1, but shortly after that time it will be necessary to increase considerably the force in this depart-

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*See Blunt to Dodge, February 14, and Dodge to Pope, March 1, pp. 851, 1053.

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