Abstract from return of the Western Sub-District of Texas, Brigadier General James E. Slaughter, C. S. Army, commanding, for February, 1865.

Present for duty.

Effective

Command. Officers. Men. total pres

ent.

Staff. 7 1 1

Northern Division. 33 216 216

Eastern Division. 10 120 120

Western Division. 17 199 199

Southern Division. 22 398 398

Fort Brown. 19 179 179

Fourth Regiment, Arizo 10 252 252

na Brigade.

Total. 118 1,365 1,365

CONTINUATION:

Pieces of

artillery.

Aggregate Aggregate

Command. present. present a Heavy Field.

nd absent

Staff. 8 8 ----

-----

Northern Division. 291 388 ----

-----

Eastern Division. 146 236 ----

-----

Western Division. 289 456 ----

-----

Southern Division. 512 865 ----

-----

Fort Brown. 215 336 ---- 6

Fourth Regiment, 291 520 ----

-----

Arizona Brigade.

Total. 1,752 2,809 ---- 6

HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,
Shreveport, La., March 1, 1865.

Major General J. G. WALKER, Commanding District of Texas, &c.:

GENERAL: I am directed by the general commanding to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated January 29, and to say that the heavy rains and impassable condition of the roads will delay the dismounting of the cavalry at Hempstead and their reorganization into an infantry division for the support of the position at Galveston. Gillespie's, Anderson's, and Bradford's regiments, which are ordered to be dismounted, will make a small addition to your force on the island. Until the arrival of the division which will be organized at Hempstead you can strengthen the garrison by any means in your power from the Reserve Corps or the troops at other points within your district. In regard to the defense of Glaveston there is only one point which he wishes to impresses upon you, the garrison must be saved and arrangements must be made for communications with the mainland, so as to leave means at your disposal for the withdrawal of the garrison at the last moment. The importance of the position, in both a political and military point of view, requires that we should hold possession of that place as long as we possibly can, and no efforts should b e spared to strengthen its defenses and increase the probability of our being able to hold it. On the other hand, the position is so weak and the means at the disposal of the enemy so extensive (Galveston being the only port in our possession) the place must fall and that speedily whenever a concentration of land and naval forces is brought against it. The problem which you have to solve is the holding the position at Galveston as long as possible without the sacrificing of its garrison. You may be unable to withdraw the guns and the material may be lost, but the garrison should be saved. In regard to the fortifications at Houston he directs me to say that it is the great strategic point in that section of country and the object of defenses there or in front of it is to delay the enemy until re-enforcements can arrive. An extensive system of works should not be begun at once. The means at your disposal should be concentrated to the completion in detail of strong works at the most important points. If time admits, these works can be afterward connected by a more extensive system.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. R. BOGGS,

Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.