commissaries of subsistence, whom I have ordered to Richmond for the purpose, may be intrusted with the transportation of the above specified amount, or as much of it as possible, to be placed in the treasury here and drawn out on warrants as required.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. KIRBY SMITH,

General.

ENGINEER BUREAU, TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT,

Shreveport, March 15, 1865.

General E. KIRBY SMITH:

GENERAL: I have the honor to call your attention to the defenses of the District of Texas with a view to the preparations necessary to defeat an advance of the enemy into the interior of the country, should he gain a foothold at any point on the coast from Sabine Pass to the Brazos. I consider the reduction of the defenses of Glaveston dn of Sabine Pass a work of so short a time, if prosecuted with vigor and the usual combinations of the enemy, that I shall discuss the question which I now consider it our duty to direct our energies and attention to, regarding those works in the enemy's possession. I have previously recommended that an interior line of defense, looking to the coast, should be adopted, and suggested Liberty, on the Trinity River, the head of navigation, and one the railroad from Houston to Orange, as one point to be fortified, and Richmond, an the Brazos, and on the line of railroad from Harrisburg to Alleyton, as a second point. In this suggestion I had in view what to my mind is an absolute certainty, viz, that the enemy, after establishing himself on the coast, would move on Houston as an objective point in his campaigns. My plan was to make Liberty and Richmond intrenched camps for defense by 2,000 or 3,000 men, while Houston was strongly fortified and the enemy forced to take it by siege. In holding the positions at Liberty and Richmond you force the enemy to move over long lines or to expose his flanks in advancing directly on Houston from Glaveston. In the first instance you gain time and seize every strong point in your retreat, delaying the enemy and forcing him to develop. In the second, by enterprise and skill you are in position to inflict disastrous defeat upon him. I of course do not attempt for a moment to prove that either of the points is impregnable and cannot be turned, but, taking the ground that fortified positions are only intended to force the enemy to develop and to dens, and around which an army should operate, I believe that my plan, if carried out, will result in material good. Houston is the heart of Texas, the point at which the railroads center, and if occupied by the enemy affords him a point within easy and rapid communication with his depot, which he may either establish at Beaumont, moving via Sabine Pass or Galveston, having captured that position, and from which he may at leisure and with perfect security discuss his further advance.

Take Galveston and we are at once forced to abandon Sabine Pass and the mouth of the Brazos, and with the probability of losing our material and men at both points should we attempt to concentrate our forces at Houston, as we should have the longer lines to move over to reach that point; or on the contrary, take either Sabine or the mouth of the Brazos, and Galveston is turned and must be abandoned. By fortifying Liberty and Richmond we have points on either line to meet the enemy and delay his movements, affording us time to remove our

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