the crisis to which you allude in your letter of yesterday, and if Atlanta, is the "scene of action" to which you refer, the distance to be accomplished, even after they cross the river, would render it necessary for adequate arrangements to be made on the other side of the Mississippi as well as on this to insure rapidity of movement and preserve the efficiency of the men, so that they could arrive in time and in condition for the performance of the services required of them. With this view, therefore, I applied in a former communication for permission to cross at once to the other side, where I could assume command of the department as directed by the War Department and hasten all the necessary arrangements. This permission having been refused by you I am without knowledge of the location and number of our forces on the other side, and as to the assistance which they can give to a column of infantry marching over so extensive a country. For the reason of the movement being beyond and control, the plan of crossing being devised by yourself, the necessary provision for subsistence and transportation, when the troops do cross, not being made, and being myself powerless under your instructions to remedy these vital deficiencies, I deem it proper to state to you that while I shall, to the best of my ability, carry out the instructions contained in your communication of yesterday, I do not deem myself responsible either for the failure or success of the undertaking which you direct.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. TAYLOR,

Lieutenant-General.

RICHMOND, VA., August 8, 1864.

(Via Clinton, Miss., August 9.)

Lieutenant S. F. CHIPLEY:

(For General E. Kirby Smith.)

Your dispatch of 30th July, 1864, received, and after inquiries can find no record of a telegram ordering you to send General Taylor and infantry from the Trans-Mississippi Department across the Mississippi River. No such order was ever given by me, though propositions to follow enemy's movements from your department were referred to your discretion in terms which implied the expectation you would do all which was consistent with the duties of your position. You had not communicated the purpose to commence offensive operations in Arkansas and Missouri, and no indications of it had reached me. I do not now perceive how the success of a movement, the arrangement for which you say had been perfected, could depend on infantry which was below the Lower Red River. Be that as it may, you must expect frequent diversity of views unless fuller information is given. I directed General S. D. Lee to keep you informed, so as having cointelligence there might be the more effective co-operation. If our forces succeed on the east side they will make easy the plans for the west side of the Mississippi. If our forces on the west side of the river should allow the enemy to leave that section, and by concentrating defeat those on the east side, your projected campaign could not fail to end in disaster. This was so obvious that I expected you to act without waiting for orders, so as to counteract the movement he was reported to be making with the troops you had lately defeated. Your recommendation in reference to General Buckner has been referred to War Department.

JEFF'N DAVIS.