series of grand maneuvers upon the whole length of the coast of Texas. General Green's division was transferred to Galveston and the mouth of the Brazos to meet a powerful force landed on Matagorda Peninsula. Throughout the winter General Magruder was occupied in foiling the designs of the enemy who, numerically, was greatly his superior.

This brings me to the point of time when the spring campaign opened, and I beg you to remark the position of the opposing forces. My lines extended from the Indian Territory, through Arkansas, to the Mississippi and down to the month of the Red River thence by the Atchafalaya to Berwick Bay, and from thence by the coast to the Colorado. A small body of troops was engaged in observing the enemy at Brownsville. My forces were massed in three principal bodied, to wit, under Magruder, opposite Banks, on Matagorda Peninsula; under Price, confronting Steele; under Taylor, holding the lower Red River.

The immense transportation of the enemy admitted of his taking the initiative with his entire force at any moment against any portion of my extended lines, while my limited transportation and the wide distances which separated my commands made it impossible to effect rapid concentration or assume the offensive. My only alternative was to wait the development of the enemy's plans, to retire before him until I effected my concentrations, and to endeavor to maneuver to throw the principal mass, if not my whole force, against one of his columns.

As I wrote you in the fall of 1863, I was satisfied that the line of Red River would be the line of his principal attack, because, as I then said, when the water rose so as to admit his gun-boats, he could employ his powerful naval armament in conjunction with the advance of his infantry column. In accordance with this view, I had established last fall subsistence and forage depots along the roads through the barren country between Texas and Red River and between Camden and Natchitoches.

I omitted to state that I had been obliged to keep a force in the Indian Territory to hold in check several thousand men under Thayer at Fort Smith, and to cover Northern Texas, filled with disloyal people. The water in the beginning of February being in a stage to admit gun-boats into Red River, General Banks suddenly transferred his force to New Orleans and Berwick Bay, leaving but 6,000 or 8,000 men in Matagorda Peninsula, who subsequently joined him at Alexandria after the retreat from Mansfield. Between the 21st and 26th of February I directed General Magruder to hold Green's division in constant marching order. On the 6th of March the division was ordered to move with dispatch to join General Taylor, who was embarrassed for want of cavalry. On the 12th of March a body of 8,000 or 10,000 men, composed of portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps, under General A. J. Smith, moved down from Vicksburg to Simsport, and subsequently advanced on Fort De- Russy, taking it in reverse, that General Taylor was not allowed time to concentrate and cover this most important work, our only means of arresting the progress of the gun-boats. The fall of the work and the immediate movement of the enemy by means of his transports to Alexandria placed General Taylor in a very embarrassing situation. He extricated himself, with his characteristic tact, by a march of seventy miles through the pine woods.

Banks now pressed forward from Berwick Bay by the line of the Teche, and by the aid of steamers both on the Mississippi and Red Rivers concentrated at Alexandria a force of 30,000 men, supported by the most powerful naval armament ever employed on a river.

As soon a I had received intelligence of the debarkation of the enemy at Simsport, I ordered General Price to dispatch his entire infantry to Shreveport, and General Maxey to move toward Price, and when Steele advanced, to join Price with his whole command, Indians included. The cavalry east of the Ouachita was directed to fall back toward Natchitoches and subsequently to oppose, as far as possible, the advance of the enemy's fleet. It was under command of General Liddell. All disposable infantry detachments in Texas were directed on Marshall; and although the enemy still had a force of several thousand on the coast, I reduced the number of men holding the defenses to an absolute minimum. General Magruder's field report shows that but 2,300 men were left in the entire District of Texas. Except these, every effective soldier in the department was put in front of Steele or in support of Taylor. When this was accomplished the disparity in numbers was frightful. Taylor had at Mansfield after the junction of Green, 11,000 effectives, with 5,00 infantry from Price's army in one day's march from him at Keachie. Price, with 6,000 or 8,000 cavalry, was engaged in impeding the advance of Steele, whose column did not number less than 15,000 of all arms.

Banks pushed on to Natchitoches. It was expected he would be detained there several days in accumulating supplies. Steele, on the Little Missouri, and Banks, at Natchitoches, were either but about 100 miles from Shreveport or Marshall. The character of the country did not admit of their forming a junction above Natchitoches, and if they advanced equally I hoped by refusing one to fight the other with my whole force. It seemed probable at this time that Steele would come up